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1067 
Taxing Option Luck 
Jeesoo Nam* 
As economic inequality reaches new heights every decade, academics stress the 
importance of the tax system in matters of equity. In contemporary winner-take-all markets, 
much of the massive income and wealth accumulated by the rich are the result of deliberate 
and calculated economic gambles that turned out in their favor. Yet theories of distributive 
justice such as Ronald Dworkin’s brute luck egalitarianism have committed themselves to 
the position that even if these market outcomes are the results of luck, the unequal outcomes 
are justified insofar as investors chose to take such risks. 
This Article argues, in contrast to the aforementioned theories, that inequalities 
resulting from option luck, the luck involved in deliberate and calculated gambles, remain 
unjust. This theory entails novel arguments in favor of imposing additional tax burdens on 
the most well-off members of our society and taxing capital income by demonstrating the 
extent to which unequal market outcomes are undeserved. Technological developments have 
led to winner-take-all markets in which even small amounts of option luck can lead to a 
wide divergence in results. A further tax imposed on the winners of such markets helps 
neutralize the economic inequalities resulting from luck. Differences in capital income are 
partly unjust because differential returns to investments are attributable, in large part, to 
chance. A tax on capital income compresses the distribution of these returns by lowering the 
returns to winning bets (by taxing such returns) and the losses of losing bets (by allowing 
deductions for such losses). 
  
 
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Tax Law, New York University School of Law. I would like to thank 
Anne Alstott, Joseph Bankman, Lily Batchelder, Greg Cui, Noël Cunningham, Steven Dean, William 
Eskridge, Mitchell Kane, Sarah Lawsky, Yair Listokin, Laurie Malman, Liam Murphy, Takayuki 
Nagato, Daniel Shaviro, John Steines, David Weisbach, Minkeun Woo, and participants in the  
NYU – Lawyering Scholarship Colloquium. Any errors are mine and mine alone. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In September of 2016, just weeks after the Rio Olympics, Congress passed a 
bill exempting prizes awarded to athletes at the Olympic games from the federal 
income tax.1 The law, now I.R.C. § 74(d), is an exception to I.R.C. § 74(a), the 
general provision which explicitly includes “prizes and awards” as the recipient’s 
income. The bill passed the Senate unanimously and the House with near 
unanimous support (415 to 1).2 The massive support the bill received in Congress 
contrasted starkly with how tax policy analysts perceived the new legislation. 
The political rhetoric surrounding the bill—Chuck Schumer painting the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as formerly “punishing” national heroes via 
taxation, for example—made little sense to tax scholars.3 The IRS, after all, is not 
 
1. H.R. 5946, 114th Cong. (2016). 
2. Id.; H.R.5946 – United States Appreciation for Olympians and Paralympians Act of 2016, 
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/5946/all-actions?overview 
=closed#tabs [https://perma.cc/Y6ZA-ARWR] ( last visited Nov. 29, 2020).  
3. See, e.g., Adam Chodorow, Olympians Don’t Need a Tax Break, SLATE (Aug. 26, 2016, 5:34 
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2016/08/giving_olympians_a_tax_break_ 
is_bad_for_america.html [https://perma.cc/HQN2-SVZ5]; Ira Stoll, Pols Deserve Olympic Medal in 
Sport of Fiscal Hypocrisy for the Latest Tax Scheme, N.Y. SUN (Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.nysun.com/
national/pols-deserve-olympic-medal-in-fiscal-hypocrisy/89686/ [https://web.archive.org/web/202011 
06084105/https://www.nysun.com/national/pols-deserve-olympic-medal-in-fiscalhypocrisy/89686/]. 
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a penal institution, and the imposition of tax is not an imposition of punishment.4 
If anything, it seems that carving out this exception to the income tax is the 
injustice, given that Olympic victories involve a substantial amount of luck. 5 
Winning a gold medal at the Olympics requires almost everything to go right. Part 
of what needs to go right is unending effort on the part of the athlete—the claim 
that luck is involved is analytically distinct from the claim that effort is not 
involved—but the athlete must likewise be the winner of several lotteries. The 
athlete is greatly helped if he or she wins the genetic lottery, guaranteeing the 
physical attributes necessary to perform at the highest levels, and the parenting 
lottery, which gives athletes access to high levels of professional training at young 
ages. These are brute luck lotteries: lotteries for which the participants never chose 
to “play the odds,” so to speak.6 Children do not choose which genes to be born 
with or, for the most part, the qualities of their parents.7 And there are other 
lotteries that influence the outcome as well. Who could forget the darling of the 
Rio Olympics, Chinese swimmer Fu Yuanhui, revealing in an interview that her 
performance sunk after her period began?8 One’s day-to-day physical condition 
matters and is to a large extent outside of one’s control. There is similarly luck in 
the quality of one’s coach or training program. Given the fact that there is always 
less than full information about the different coaching options available, it makes 
it a gamble as to who can really provide the most value-added. However, such 
option luck differs from brute luck in that the participant chose to play the lottery.9 
A coach might turn out to be good or bad, but insofar as the athlete was aware of 
the risk, he cast the die. 
Given the massive amount of brute and option luck involved, we may 
question to what extent it is effort that divides a gold medalist from a fourth-place 
finisher going home empty-handed.10 There is no doubt that a gold medal winner 
worked hard to stand on the podium, but surely so has the fourth-place finisher. 
And if the difference is largely a matter of luck, then common-sense fairness 
dictates that government should work to close the gap between the economic 
 
4. See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 
31–37 (2002). 
5. Stoll, supra note 3. 
6. RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY OF PRACTICE AND EQUALITY  
73 (2000). 
7. I take it as prima facie plausible that the quality of one’s parents is partly influenced by 
decisions children make. For instance, the decision of a child to fight with his parent may make the 
parent more tired and, thus, worse at parenting. In such a case, the resulting parent qualities would 
not be a matter of brute luck, but rather option luck. 
8. Tom Phillips, ‘It’s Because I Had My Period’: Swimmer Fu Yuanhui Praised for Breaking 
Taboo, GUARDIAN (Aug. 15, 2016, 11:27 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2016/aug/16/
chinese-swimmer-fu-yuanhui-praised-for-breaking-periods-taboo [https://perma.cc/KAN6-BXK6]. 
9. DWORKIN, supra note 6. 
10. For an extensive discussion of causation from both a legal and metaphysical perspective, 
see generally MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS, 
AND METAPHYSICS (2009).  
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outcomes of the lucky and unlucky. Yet I.R.C. § 74(d) does quite the opposite. By 
exempting Olympic award income from taxation, lucky winners get an even 
greater reward from their luck than they otherwise would have.  
The proposition that there is something unfair about a person being worse 
off or better off merely as a matter of luck is prominent not only in the common 
sense of laymen,11 but also the literature in legal theory and moral and political 
philosophy. 12  Of particular interest to tax scholars is how the idea relates to 
distributive justice, the area of political philosophy which examines how we ought 
to distribute the benefits and burdens of a society among its members through 
institutional design. 13  Luck egalitarians believe that differential results brought 
about by luck are unjust.14 Therefore, the government has at least a prima facie 
obligation to neutralize the effects of luck on citizens. There are, broadly speaking, 
two methods of neutralization. The first method neutralizes bad luck by providing 
assistance to the unlucky. We might, for example, provide additional educational 
resources to the children of underprivileged families. The second method 
neutralizes good luck by taxing the lucky. We might, for example, repeal  
I.R.C. § 74(d) and tax Olympic gold medalists on their income. 
Admittedly, from a revenue perspective, the Olympic prize exception is so 
small as to be nearly irrelevant. The United States Olympic Committee provides 
$37,500 for each gold medal earned at the Olympics, and a very small percentage 
of U.S. taxpayers win gold medals.15 The cash prizes may be significant to the 
individual athletes receiving them, but the Olympic prize tax base is small potatoes 
to the public fisc. In total, the entire bill was estimated to decrease revenues by 
just $3 million over ten years.16 
What the Olympic example highlights, more importantly, is the intuitive 
notion behind luck egalitarianism that we do not deserve the results of luck. This 
intuition can be transferred to other areas of economic activity that do serve as 
significant tax bases. This Article argues in Part III that the principle of luck 
 
11.  Alexander W. Cappelen, James Konow, Erik Ø. Sørensen & Bertil Tungodden,  
Just Luck: An Experimental Study of Risk-Taking and Fairness, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 1398,  
1400 (2013). 
12. E.g., BRIAN BARRY, POLITICAL ARGUMENT 74 (2010); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE 64 (rev. ed. 1999); WOJCIECH SADURSKI, GIVING DESERT ITS DUE: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND 
LEGAL THEORY 116–17, 122 (1985) (“The general underlying aim of this conception of desert is to 
screen out all those factors that are ‘unearned’, that are beyond human control, that are dictated by 
dumb luck, and for which a person cannot claim any credit.”). 
13. Jeesoo Nam, Biomedical Enhancements as Justice, 29 BIOETHICS 126, 126 (2015). 
14. See Part II, for a more detailed description of luck egalitarianism.  
15.  Brandon Penny, U.S. Olympic Committee Significantly Increases Payments to Athletes for 
Olympic/Paralympic, World Medals, TEAM USA (Dec. 13, 2016, 6:19 PM), https://www.teamusa.org/
News/2016/December/13/US-Olympic-Committee-Significantly-Increases-Payments-To-Athletes-
For-Olympic-World-Medals [https://perma.cc/C9UB-RACP]. 
16. CONG. BUDGET OFF., COST ESTIMATE: H.R 5946, UNITED STATES APPRECIATION FOR 
OLYMPIANS AND PARALYMPIANS ACT 1 (2016), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-
congress-2015-2016/costestimate/hr5946.pdf [https://perma.cc/HV8Y-ZDKR]. 
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egalitarianism justifies taxing the most well-off members of our society at a greater 
rate and taxing capital income, drawing upon research in economics and finance 
regarding the ubiquity of luck in such market outcomes. Both of these tax issues 
are perennial hot topics17 and, in their latest foray into the zeitgeist, came to the 
forefront of the public’s attention with the initial rise of Senator Elizabeth 
Warren’s popularity for the 2020 Democratic presidential nomination.18 Senator 
Warren’s revenue proposals focused largely on taxing the rich and increasing taxes 
on savings and returns to investments.19  
Both public figures and academics have staked out positions contrary to the 
theory of luck egalitarianism as well as its aforementioned implications for tax 
policy. Commentators have bristled at the burdens levied on the wealthy by 
Senator Warren’s proposals.20 Often, such discomfort is premised on the view that 
market outcomes are presumptively just and the most industrious among us are 
rewarded.21 Others, following Ronald Dworkin’s seminal works, disagree because 
 
17. The literature on these topics is rich and includes ALAN J. AUERBACH & LAURENCE  
J. KOTLIKOFF, DYNAMIC FISCAL POLICY 64–87 (1987); JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF 
POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH SOME OF THEIR APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 806–37 
(William James Ashley ed., new ed. 1923) (1848); William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash 
Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1113–15 (1974); Joseph Bankman & David  
A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58  
STAN. L. REV. 1413 (2006); Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive 
Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1952); Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the Consumption Tax, 
44 STAN. L. REV. 961 (1992); Michael J. Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92  
HARV. L. REV. 1575 (1979); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond the Pro-Consumption Tax Consensus, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 745 (2007); Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer than an Income 
Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081 (1980). This list does not exhaust the many important contributions to  
the debate. 
18. See, e.g., The Ed. Bd., Opinion, The Billionaires Are Getting Nervous, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/08/opinion/sunday/bill-gates-warren-tax.html [https:// 
perma.cc/E2YV-LVAY]. 
19 . Erica York & Garrett Watson, Reviewing Elizabeth Warren’s Tax Proposals to Fund 
Medicare for All, TAX FOUND. (Nov. 1, 2019), https://taxfoundation.org/elizabeth-warren-medicare-
for-all-tax-proposals/ [https://perma.cc/8PLN-KJ9M]. 
20.  Some of the public bristling has come directly from the wealthy themselves. The  
Ed. Bd., supra note 18. Worry about the progressivity of tax more generally is not limited to just the 
lay public. The connection between economic inequality and progressive taxation has made the topic 
an important object of study by tax scholars. See Blum & Kalven, supra note 17, at 520. 
21. See Patricia Cohen, Warren Would Take Billionaires Down a Few Billion Pegs, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/10/business/economy/warren-billionaires-
wealth-tax.html [https://perma.cc/S3QB-DTPP] (discussing the grounds of such discomfort). Such 
thoughts, of course, are not new. President George W. Bush has said that his tax cuts let Americans 
“keep more of their hard-earned dollars.” George W. Bush, President, White House, President’s 
Radio Address (Apr. 15, 2006), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/
04/text/20060415.html [https://perma.cc/9SM2-KGL5]. There are also other reasons 
commentators have levied to criticize Senator Warren’s plan, such as the disincentives it would create 
for investment. Jim Tankersley, Warren Health Plan Tightens Democrats’ Embrace of Tax Increases, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/02/business/elizabeth-warren-
health-care-plan.html [https://perma.cc/N59W-YJ4H] (“Conservative critics say they would cripple 
business investment, slow economic growth and dissuade future entrepreneurs.”).  
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they think that luck results in unjust outcomes only when the risk was not 
deliberately taken (i.e., brute luck).22 (I call the view that only brute luck leads to 
unjust outcomes brute luck egalitarianism and the view that both brute luck and 
option luck can lead to unjust outcomes luck egalitarianism.23) 
On this view, insofar as individuals deliberately chose to take on risks in their 
business ventures, their enormous winnings from market competitions and capital 
investments are justified.24 The policy implication of such a view is that we cannot 
tax wealthy winners of risky market competitions any differently from 
impoverished losers of such competitions so long as both the winner and loser, ex 
ante, had a fair shot at winning. 25  Such iron fetters prevent, on grounds of 
principle, meaningful taxation of the wealthy. 
In order to determine whether these critics are right, we must think carefully 
about the nature of distributive justice, the corresponding role of desert with 
regard to the economic outcomes of our actions, and the positive facts regarding 
the sources of inequality.  
This Article argues against the Dworkinian position that brute luck is the 
only kind of luck which leads to unjust distributions of benefits and burdens. 
Unjust distributions can arise even when the risks are deliberately taken on  
(i.e., result from option luck). This Article then analyzes the tax system from the 
perspective of luck egalitarianism, focusing on the injustice of option luck. My 
normative analysis of option luck generates novel arguments in favor of taxing 
capital income and the most well-off members of our society. Although legal 
scholarship has had much to say about taxing brute luck,26 this Article is the first 
to bring focused, systematic attention to how the tax law might be structured to 
account for option luck.  
The remainder of this Article proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly explains 
the two concepts fundamental to the tax law: base and rate. It discusses the nature 
 
22. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 73–78; cf. BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE 
STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 96–97 (1999) (stating wealth inequality would be legitimate when there is 
genuine equal opportunity).  
23. See Peter Vallentyne, Brute Luck, Option Luck, and Equality of Initial Opportunities, 112 
ETHICS 529, 540 n.17 (2002) (“It is misleading to call [brute luck egalitarianism just] ‘luck 
egalitarianism,’ since it does not call for equalizing option luck.”). 
24. To the extent that such results are brought about by brute luck, such as differences in 
natural ability, brute luck egalitarians would, analytically, find differential outcomes to be unjust. See 
infra Section II.B. 
25. See infra Section II.B. 
26. The literature detailing the taxation of brute luck includes MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 
4, at 103–07; Anne L. Alstott, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121 HARV. L. REV. 469 
(2007); Barbara H. Fried, Compared to What? Taxing Brute Luck and Other Second-Best Problems, 
53 TAX L. REV. 377, 385–95 (2000); Eric Rakowski, Can Wealth Taxes Be Justified?, 
53 TAX L. REV. 263, 353–54 (2000); Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Endowment, 55 DUKE L.J. 1145,  
1153–81 (2006). 
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of progressive taxation and the role of capital in distinguishing between the 
commonly considered tax bases: wealth, wage, income, and consumption. 
Part II outlines and argues in favor of a broad conception of luck 
egalitarianism. It teases out the theoretical nuances of the common-sense principle 
that it is unfair for a person to be made better or worse off than others purely as a 
matter of luck. I further argue that such unfairness persists even for those who 
chose to take such risks. Justice does not depend on the option luck/brute  
luck distinction.  
Part III considers the design of tax law to achieve luck egalitarian aims. One 
way the government would be able to further such goals is greater taxation of the 
most well-off members of our society. The dynamics of winner-take-all markets 
create a wide divergence in economic outcomes between winners and losers, and 
the highly competitive nature of such markets makes it nearly impossible to win 
without luck on one’s side. Another way the government would be able to further 
luck egalitarian goals is the taxation of capital income. The received wisdom from 
financial economics is that most investments have a lottery-like component, 
which separates winners and losers on the basis of luck. I explain that these 
differential effects can be partly neutralized by the imposition of an income tax, 
thereby promoting distributive justice under the luck egalitarian conception. 
Part IV adds to the ongoing debate in tax scholarship about whether 
taxpayer behavior shifts in response to a capital income tax to eliminate the effects 
of imposing such a tax. From the critic’s point of view, a taxpayer will respond to 
a tax on capital income by taking on more risk, thereby counteracting the tax’s 
purpose of neutralizing the impact of luck. A key premise of the critic’s view is 
that individuals are ultimately motivated by a financial incentive to undo the 
effects of a capital income tax. In response, I argue that taxpayers have both 
primary and derivative moral reason not to eliminate the effects of a tax on capital 
income. Contrary to the standard picture of the IRS and taxpayer as cat and 
mouse, I put forth that tax law is better understood as a collaborative enterprise 
between state and citizen. We know that we each have an obligation to contribute 
towards a societal pool to fund government functions, but it is very hard to figure 
out what the size of such a contribution should be. Citizens have, as a group, 
employed legislative and administrative agents to resolve the difficult moral 
problem of the appropriate level of how much they ought to contribute. To 
voluntarily eliminate the effects of imposing a tax on capital income would run 
counter to the taxpayer’s moral aim of providing the appropriate amount to the 
societal pool. This sketch is the first step of a long-term project detailing the 
proper relation between taxpayer and state. 
I consider the main contributions of this Article to be the introduction to the 
tax literature of several conceptual tools for policy analysis. The Article lays out 
both positive and normative features of option luck and outlines the proper 
boundaries of a luck egalitarian theory of justice. The Article also puts forth a view 
of how taxpayers ought to conceive of the tax law as a collaborative enterprise, 
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which is novel to tax scholarship. Although such tools are used herein to 
demonstrate that a tax on the most well-off members of our society and a tax on 
capital income can be justified on the grounds of luck egalitarianism, given their 
theoretical nature, they can be used generally across various contexts. My hope is 
that these contributions will serve as helpful resources for future thinking about 
the tax law and other areas of law important for distributive justice, such as health 
care and education policy. 
I. BASE AND RATE AS THE FOUNDATIONS OF TAX LAW 
The concerns of this Article regarding capital income and the relative tax 
burdens of the rich and poor are, put in more technical language, proposals about 
the tax base and the tax rate. The concepts of base and rate constitute the 
foundations of tax law.27 A tax base is a set of properties (such as the property of 
being a citizen for purposes of a head tax or one’s labor income in a wage tax), the 
instantiation of which is taxed by the government.28 The tax rate determines the 
amount that a taxpayer must pay to the government, typically given some qualities 
of the taxpayer (such as her level of income, her marital status, her elections 
made,29 etc.), for the instantiated property being taxed. Even the simplest tax 
system must determine what to tax and how much to tax it. 
A. Progressive Tax Rates 
Our current income tax system has a facially progressive rate structure. A 
taxpayer must pay greater amounts of tax for each additional dollar of income 
earned as the taxpayer moves up the income brackets.30 In substance, however, 
the calculation of one’s tax liability is a complex function dependent on what kind 
of income one has, which can violate progressivity. For instance, if one’s income 
is composed entirely of long-term capital gains, one will have lower tax liability 
than those with slightly less income derived entirely from employment.31  One 
alternative to a progressive rate structure would be a flat rate structure, under 
which the amount of tax paid for each dollar of income earned does not change 
 
27. Query whether these two pillars are indeed two. I suppose that the rate concept could 
subsume the base concept since to be excluded from the tax base is equivalent to having a tax rate of 
zero, and to be included in the tax base is equivalent to having a nonzero tax rate. Nevertheless, I 
follow the standard treatment in tax policy literature of distinguishing between the concepts of base 
and rate. Better to risk being redundant than to risk being incomplete. 
28. Joel Slemrod defines the concept of a tax base as those “events or states of the world 
[that] trigger tax liability.” Joel Slemrod, Tax Compliance and Enforcement, 57 J. ECON. LITERATURE 
904, 905 (2019). Events and states of the world are properties on a broad construal of properties,  
i.e., properties as ways of being. 
29. E.g., Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (2019). 
30. I.R.C. § 1. 
31. I.R.C. § 1(h), (j). 
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with respect to the taxpayer’s income.32 How to measure the overall progressivity 
of the tax system is a contentious matter, but one estimate, by economists 
Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman, measures tax burden as a proportion of 
income to be mostly flat with respect to pretax income level.33 Surprisingly, the 
top 400 Americans with the highest pretax income paid a lower tax rate than the 
rest of the population.34  
Progressive taxes are often justified on utilitarian grounds by appealing to 
the assumption of declining marginal utility.35 There are variations on the theme 
(at least one of which extends as far back as the eighteenth-century philosopher 
Jeremy Bentham), 36  but here is a straightforward utilitarian version of the 
argument. Suppose one thinks that laws should maximize the total utility of a 
society. According to the assumption of declining marginal utility, taking away a 
dollar from a rich person brings him less disutility than taking away a dollar from a 
poor person.37 That dollar is, in a sense, worth less to the rich person than the 
poor person. Putting those two theses together, tax law ought to redistribute from 
the rich to the poor, where the marginal dollar can provide more utility.38 
Although often made, the assumption of declining marginal utility has not 
 
32. Research into optimal income tax models, flowing from J.A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in 
the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 REV. ECON. STUD. 175 (1971), have implications for the 
tax rate. In this Article, I am more concerned with desert than maximizing welfare, so I put aside 
discussions of optimal income tax models for the purpose of expository expedience.  
33. EMMANUEL SAEZ & GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF INJUSTICE: HOW THE RICH 
DODGE TAXES AND HOW TO MAKE THEM PAY 14–15 (2019) [hereinafter SAEZ & ZUCMAN, THE 
TRIUMPH OF INJUSTICE ]; Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Opinion, How to Tax Our Way Back 
to Justice, N.Y. Times (Oct. 11, 2019) [hereinafter Saez & Zucman, How to Tax Our Way Back to 
Justice ], https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/11/opinion/sunday/wealth-income-tax-rate.html [https:// 
perma.cc/7B7G-SQXQ]. Estimating tax burdens necessitates making difficult decisions about both 
how we measure the tax burden of an income group as well as how to make precise the vague 
concept of one’s overall tax burden. See also Garrett Watson, Saez and Zucman’s Latest Estimates of 
Tax Burdens Don’t Fully Consider the Impact of Taxes on Saving and Investment, TAX  
FOUND. (Oct. 28, 2019), https://taxfoundation.org/emmanuel-saez-gabriel-zucman-triumph-of-
injustice/ [https://perma.cc/75BV-2SFZ] (criticizing the decisions made by Saez and Zucman in 
their estimates with emphasis on the importance of taking into account transfers in a holistic view of 
the fiscal system). An alternate estimate by the Congressional Budget Office calculates the average 
federal tax rate to be progressive. CONG. BUDGET OFF., PROJECTED CHANGES IN THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME, 2016 TO 2021, at 17 (2019), https://www.cbo. 
gov/system/files/2019-12/55941-CBO-Household-Income.pdf [https://perma.cc/XP4R-575H]. 
34. SAEZ & ZUCMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF INJUSTICE, supra note 33, at 14–15; Saez & Zucman, 
How to Tax Our Way Back to Justice, supra note 33. Saez and Zucman detail their methodology in 
SAEZ & ZUCMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF INJUSTICE, supra note 33, at 6,  https://eml.berkeley.edu/
~saez/SZ2019Appendix.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4RX-3PHH] (specifying in the online appendix of 
the book that they are analyzing “the top 400 adults with the highest pre-tax income” and that “the 
top 400 in pre-tax income and the top 400 in wealth are essentially the same”). 
35.  Sarah B. Lawsky, On the Edge: Declining Marginal Utility and Tax Policy, 95 
MINN. L. REV. 904, 908 (2011). 
36. See MILL, supra note 17, at 806. 
37. Lawsky, supra note 35, at 904, 915. 
38. Id. at 917. 
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been conclusively supported by argument.39 There is evidence that marginal utility 
may be increasing rather than decreasing at some levels of income. 40  If the 
utilitarian argument is to be consistently followed, then the tax law ought to 
redistribute from the poor to the rich wherever marginal utility is  
locally increasing.41 
Progressive taxes, given their role of redistributing tax burdens from poor 
taxpayers to rich taxpayers, may alternatively be justified on nonreductive 
egalitarian grounds as a partial solution to the massive and continually growing 
economic inequality in the United States.42 The top 1% of income earners earn 
20% of all income.43 The top .01% of income earners have an average income of 
$28 million while the bottom 50% have an average income of $16,200.44 The gains 
to income since 1980 have been almost entirely captured by the top half of 
income earners.45 There is something prima facie unsettling about such a disparity 
in market outcomes. Under what set of theoretical commitments and empirical 
propositions could such large divides in market outcomes be justified? 
B. Tax Bases: The Role of Capital 
On the issue of tax base, there have been two fierce debates. The first 
debate concerns what the tax base ought to be. As a matter of straight tax theory, 
there are no limits to what the tax base can be. A government has the capacity to 
tax an individual on the basis of any property’s instantiation in the world. As a 
practical matter, however, there are really just four candidate tax base categories 
that are in serious consideration for organizing national tax systems: income, wage, 
wealth, and consumption.46  Within each category are several variations of the 
central idea that ties the category together. These variations often arise due to the 
rule of law’s need to define hard borders at the penumbra of these vague concepts 
of income, wage, wealth, and consumption, as well as the practical limitations on 
enforcing an ideal income tax, ideal wealth tax, etc. For instance, two tax bases 
 
39. See also MILL, supra note 17, at 807 (“It may be said, indeed, that to take 100l. from 
1000l. . . . is a heavier impost than 1000l. taken from 10,000l. . . . . But this doctrine seems to me too 
disputable altogether . . . .”). 
40. Lawsky, supra note 35, at 904, 937. 
41. Id. at 941. 
42. Blum & Kalven, supra note 17, at 487. For one to view this account as “alternative” to the 
marginal utility account, one would need to deny that the concern regarding inequality reduces to a 
concern about marginal utility. 
43.  Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Distributional National  
Accounts: Methods and Estimates for the United States, 133 Q.J. ECON. 553, 575 tbl.1 (2018). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 577. 
46. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, DEBORAH H. SCHENK & ANNE L. ALSTOTT, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 38 (8th ed. 2018). In practice, countries rely on a mix of tax 
bases. See also JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 552–53 (5th ed. 2016) 
(discussing the multiple tax bases at play for countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development). 
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may both fall under the income tax category but differ on whether to provide a 
deduction for the donation of gifts. I mention such differences only so that we 
can set them aside. This Article deals not with the intracategory differences, but 
instead an important intercategory difference. A central theme in deciding 
between these four bases, and a key topic of this Article, is the taxation of savings 
and the yield from savings (i.e., capital income).47 
A brief discussion on how such taxes are connected to the four candidate tax 
bases will be worthwhile. Consider first wage and wealth as bases of taxation. By 
definition, labor and capital are distinct factors of production.48 Therefore, an 
ideal wage tax would exclude capital income from taxation. 49  A wealth tax, 
however, taxes savings indirectly.50 Since savings are just the accretions to one’s 
wealth, the amount one has saved is a component of wealth until such amounts 
are spent or transferred to another. 
Academically, more attention has been given to the role of savings in 
distinguishing between the tax bases of income and consumption. Income, under 
the dominant Haig-Simons formulation, was defined by Henry Simons himself as  
the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in 
consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property 
rights between the beginning and end of the period in question. In other 
words, it is merely the result obtained by adding consumption during the 
period to “wealth” at the end of the period and then subtracting “wealth” 
at the beginning.51  
Put this way, it is easy to see that the debate between an income tax and a 
consumption tax is really a debate about taxing the accretion to wealth  
(i.e., savings).52 Unlike a consumption tax, which taxes only the portion of income 
consumed, an income tax is indifferent as to whether a taxpayer’s income is 
consumed or saved as it taxes all income. The tax on savings is what differentiates 
 
47. Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 17, at 1417. In this Article, I sometimes use the terms 
savings and investments interchangeably, which glosses over some subtleties. Cf. id. (treating the 
distinction between an income tax and a consumption tax as “the taxation of the return to savings or 
capital income” and, thus, the consumption tax as equivalent to a tax on labor); David A. Weisbach, 
Ironing Out the Flat Tax, 52 STAN. L. REV. 599, 603 (2000) (“The change in savings in a given period 
is equal to the difference between amounts saved and amounts withdrawn from savings to be used for 
consumption. We can measure this difference by measuring difference in receipts from the sale of 
investments and the outlays for the purchase of investments.”). 
48 . David A. Weisbach, A Guide to the GOP Tax Plan – The Way to a Better Way, 8  
COLUM. J. TAX L. 171, 182 (2017). 
49. As a practical matter, whether income was derived from labor or capital is often hard  
to discern. 
50.  See, e.g., ACKERMAN & ALSTOTT, supra note 22, at 94–112 (a concrete wealth  
tax proposal). 
51. HENRY CALVERT SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF 
INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938). 
52. Weisbach, supra note 48 (citing NICHOLAS KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX (1955) as 
the first to make this observation).  
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an income tax from a consumption tax. To move from a consumption tax to an 
income tax, we could impose a tax on savings. By the same identity, to move from 
an income tax to a consumption tax, we could provide a deduction for savings.53 
Such a tax system would be a cash flow consumption tax.54 
Having explicated the relation between each candidate tax base and either 
the taxation of savings or the taxation of the yield from savings, it will be 
worthwhile to now briefly explicate the interrelation between the tax on savings 
and the tax on the yield from savings. Following the Cary Brown theorem, under 
certain conditions, a deduction for savings is equivalent to a tax exemption for the 
yield from savings.55 That means that, under those conditions, a yield exemption 
tax would be equivalent to a cash flow consumption tax. Such conditions 
importantly include the identity of applicable tax rates, the taxpayer realizing the 
full benefit of a deduction for savings (e.g., through a tax that provides full 
refunds for negative amounts), and the reinvestment of the tax benefit gained 
from an exemption at the same rate of return.56 
An example will help to illustrate this equivalence. Suppose that there is no 
tax on capital income. Under this regime, a taxpayer decides to save just $5 in 
Period 1 by purchasing a portion of Greenacre for investment, which provides a 
market rate of return. In table 1 below, this $5 amount is enclosed in parentheses 
to represent a negative amount for the investor. In Period 2, the value of 
Greenacre quadruples. The taxpayer’s investment is worth $20, yielding a profit of 
$15 once the initial $5 cost is subtracted. 
 
Table 1: Investment in Yield Exemption 
Greenacre 
 Period 1 Period 2 After-tax profit 
Investor (5) 20 15 
Government 0 0 0 
 
Suppose now that the government, instead of exempting capital income, had 
provided a deduction for any amounts saved. Suppose further that there is 
otherwise a tax of 50% imposed on income. These two positions constitute a cash 
 
53. See Weisbach, supra note 48, at 182 (“An income tax with a deduction for savings (that is, a 
consumption tax) is simply a tax on cash flows.”). 
54. Id. 
55.  E. Cary Brown, Business-Income Taxation and Investment Incentives, in INCOME, 
EMPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ALVIN E. HANSEN 300, 301  
(Lloyd A. Metzler ed., 1948). 
56. GRAETZ ET AL., supra note 46, at 317; Daniel N. Shaviro, Replacing the Income Tax with a 
Progressive Consumption Tax, TAX NOTES 91, 99 (Apr. 5, 2004), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-
notes-today/fundamental-tax-system-structure/replacing-income-tax-progressive-consumption-tax/
2004/04/06/ynbt [https://perma.cc/G8GF-93KA]. Graetz denies that the premises will hold, and 
therefore doubts the conclusion derived from such premises. Graetz, supra note 17, at 1602. 
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flow consumption tax.57 If the taxpayer wants to replicate the result of the yield 
exemption system, he could invest $10 in Greenacre in Period 1. Notice that the 
extra $5 invested is just the value of the deduction for savings (50% of $10 saved) 
that the taxpayer receives in this alternate system.58 That means that the after-tax 
cost of purchasing that portion of Greenacre was just $5. In Period 2, that 
investment is worth $40, all of which is taxable income since the cost of the 
investment was already deducted. The cash flow tax would take 50% of that, 
leaving $20 in the taxpayer’s pocket. After subtracting the after-tax cost of the 
investment, this results in an after-tax yield of $15, replicating the end result of the 
taxpayer’s situation in the yield exemption system. Notice also that the 
government’s outcomes in the deduction scenario would be equivalent to the 
government simply choosing to invest $5 in Greenacre. 
 
Table 2: Investment with Deduction 
Greenacre 
 Period 1 Period 2 After-tax profit 
Investor (10) 40 15 
Government (5) 20 15 
 
The importance of capital as a factor of production in both the national and 
global economy cannot be overstated. Capital income accounts for 20–30% of  
U.S. national income depending on the year, and similar proportions are estimated 
for other countries as well.59 Capital income from equity and bonds has replaced 
labor income as the key driver of income inequality in the United States.60 The top 
0.1% of income earners derive more than two-thirds of their income from capital 
while the bottom 90% derive less than 20% of their income from capital.61  
Given the importance of capital in the economy, it ought to be no surprise 
that the normative question of whether we ought to tax savings and capital 
income has a rich literature.62 Both John Stuart Mill and Thomas Hobbes argued 
 
57. Weisbach, supra note 48. 
58. To replicate the yield exemption tax, a taxpayer must invest x / (1-t) where x is the 
amount he would have invested in a taxless world and t is the tax rate imposed in the cash flow tax. 
GRAETZ ET AL., supra note 46, at 316. 
59. Piketty et al., supra note 43, at 595 (citing Loukas Karabarbounis & Brent Neiman, The 
Global Decline of the Labor Share, 129 Q.J. ECON. 61 (2014)). 
60. Id. at 557, 595. 
61.  Id. at 595–96. This analysis is disputed by some economists. Matthew Smith, Danny 
Yagan, Owen Zidar & Eric Zwick, Capitalists in the Twenty-First Century, 134 Q.J. ECON.  
1675 (2019). 
62. The literature includes Andrews, supra note 17; Noël B. Cunningham, The Taxation of 
Capital Income and the Choice of Tax Base, 52 TAX L. REV. 17 (1996); Fried, supra note 17; Graetz, 
supra note 17; Warren, supra note 17. Joseph Bankman and David Weisbach have called the choice 
between an income tax and a consumption tax “[p]erhaps the single most important tax policy 
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that savings should be excluded from the tax base.63 Their arguments are familiar 
despite their age, focusing on the unfairness of taxing income whose benefit 
(consumption) has yet to be reaped, the ill economic effects of discouraging 
savings, and double taxation of the same earnings.64 
The idea of excluding savings or the yield from savings from the tax base 
remains intensely popular in today’s tax scholarship.65 In contemporary discussion, 
the main positive arguments in favor of exempting capital income from taxation 
are simplicity and efficiency.66 
In terms of simplicity, the implementation of an ideal income tax would 
impose a tremendous accounting burden. 67  Since accretions to wealth are 
considered income, any appreciation or depreciation of value in property held by a 
taxpayer must be taxed. In order for such a tax to be imposed, the change in value 
needs to be measured. Measurement of the change in value is a difficult task for 
many assets, such as real property or machinery.68 If an income tax system relied 
on self-reporting of such changes in value, the difficulty of enforcing correct 
calculations would advantage the most odious of taxpayers who aim to defraud by 
underreporting appreciations and overreporting depreciations.69 
Another advantage of exempting capital income is the economic inefficiency 
of the tax. The key insight is that a tax on capital income will distort both labor 
and savings decisions while a tax on labor income only does not distort savings 
 
decision.” Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 17, at 1414 (citing also the above authority among others 
at 1414 n.1). 
63. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 266–67 (Clarendon Press 1958) (1651); MILL, supra note 
17, at 821–37 
64. HOBBES, supra note 63; MILL, supra note 17, at 821–37; Robert B. Ekelund Jr. & Douglas  
M. Walker, J.S. Mill on the Income Tax Exemption and Inheritance Taxes: The Evidence Reconsidered, 
28 HIST. POL. ECON. 559, 563 (1996). 
65.  Shaviro, supra note 17, at 745 (“In the last two decades, the dominant norm in 
fundamental tax reform has shifted from income taxation to consumption taxation, among academics 
no less than policymakers.”); see, e.g., Martin Feldstein, The Welfare Cost of Capital Income Taxation, 
86 J. POL. ECON. S29, S37–39 (1978). 
66. See, e.g., DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 313–15 (1986); JOEL 
SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE GREAT DEBATE OVER 
TAX REFORM 184–97 (2d ed. 2000). 
67.  In practice, our income tax system strays from the ideal by taxing appreciations to 
property when such property is sold or exchanged by the taxpayer. I.R.C. § 1001(a); Cottage  
Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554 (1991). Such a rule, called the realization requirement, has its own 
issues. See generally Weisbach, supra note 48 (discussing the administrative and compliance issues that 
stem from having a realization-based income tax). For a discussion of the complexity that can arise 
from consumption taxes, see generally Deborah L. Paul, The Sources of Tax Complexity: How Much 
Simplicity Can Fundamental Tax Reform Achieve?, 76 N.C. L. REV. 151 (1997). 
68. As one example of a complication, machinery might lose value from wear and tear. See,  
e.g., Depreciation, A DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND BANKING (6th ed. 2018), https:/ 
/www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780198789741.001.0001/acref-9780198789741-e-
1011?rskey=SS6YRO&result=1 [https://perma.cc/R8EC-G2DM]. 
69. GRAETZ ET AL., supra note 46, at 30. 
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decisions.70 A standard economic perspective on savings treats it as reallocating 
consumption across time, often for the purpose of intertemporal consumption 
smoothing.71 A tax on capital income distorts work effort by lowering the payoff 
for working when such income would be saved and used for future 
consumption.72 The relative neutrality of exempting capital income makes such a 
policy more efficient.73 
The popularity of exempting capital income from tax is not limited to 
academia. Although attempts to make a complete switch from the federal income 
tax to a consumption tax have not been successful,74 legislators consistently push 
for, and have been partly successful in getting, both lower tax rates on capital 
income and greater availability of deductions for amounts saved. Consider, for 
example, the favorable treatment of many kinds of savings and capital income in 
the current tax code. As is commonly known, lower rates are available for  
long-term capital gains, and interest on state and local bonds are excluded 
entirely.75 The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, passed in 2017, lowered the corporate tax 
rate (a tax on capital income) from a top marginal rate of 35% to 21%76 and 
offered a 100% “bonus depreciation” on qualified property (the equivalent of 
providing an immediate deduction for qualified investments).77 The taxation of 
savings is a key issue not just academically, but politically as well. 
Income tax proponents on the other side of the aisle argue that the taxation 
of savings will create more just outcomes in the distribution of tax burdens. Since 
holding investments in itself is a source of influence and stability, including 
savings in the tax base leads to a better measure of social outcomes and, thus, 
better distributional consequences.78 These proponents prioritize the equalizing 
 
70. Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 17, at 1422–28. 
71. GRUBER, supra note 46, at 685–86. 
72. Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 17, at 1422–28. 
73. But cf. GRUBER, supra note 46, at 799 (discussing the literature on using savings as a way to 
target high-ability individuals “and efficiently redistribute from high-skill to low-skill individuals”). 
74. ACKERMAN & ALSTOTT, supra note 22, at 78–79 (calling a national sales tax “a fiscal 
favorite of conservatives”). Rep. Billy Tauzin’s (D-LA) National Retail Sales Tax is one such plan. 
WILLIAM G. GALE, EVAN F. KOENIG, DIANE LIM ROGERS & JOHN SABELHAUS, TAXING 
GOVERNMENT IN A NATIONAL RETAIL SALES TAX (Cong. Budget Off., Working Paper No. 1999-5, 
1998), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/105th-congress-1997-1998/workingpaper/19995 
_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CGE-S4ZG]. 
75. I.R.C. § 103 excludes state and local bond interest from gross income. I.R.C. § 1(h), (j)(5) 
reduces the tax rate on long-term capital gains. The incidence of a tax is critical to any analysis of tax 
policy, but evidence on incidence is mixed. See, e.g., BENJAMIN H. HARRIS, TAX POL’Y  
CTR., CORPORATE TAX INCIDENCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PROGRESSIVITY (2009), https://
www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/1001349-Corporate-Tax-
Incidence-and-Its-Implications-for-Progressivity.PDF [https://perma.cc/37XJ-LUXM]. 
76. I.R.C. § 11(b). “The corporate tax, for example, is paid by shareholders, because it reduces 
the amount of profit they can receive in dividends or reinvest in their companies.” Saez & Zucman, 
How to Tax Our Way Back to Justice, supra note 33. 
77. I.R.C. § 168(k). 
78. Anne L. Alstott, The Uneasy Liberal Case Against Income and Wealth Transfer Taxation: A 
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effects of the income tax over the aforementioned points of simplicity  
and efficiency.  
Interestingly enough, a second debate has arisen connected to the ebb and 
flow of the first. This second debate concerns whether the taxation of savings 
makes very much of a difference if at all. The central idea at stake here, and 
further explicated in Section IV.A below, is whether the imposition of a tax on 
capital income would elicit a countervailing response from the taxpayer to put 
himself in roughly the same position he would be in a system with no tax on 
capital income.79 If so, then that would mean the imposition of a tax on capital 
income does not significantly change tax burdens, making such a tax neither more 
just nor less just. As a distributional matter, the tax would be nearly impotent. To 
the people who believe this thesis, the great similarity in tax burden between the 
taxation and nontaxation of savings is a strong point in favor of excluding savings 
from the tax base. Since the main argument in favor of an income tax depends on 
its distributive consequences, if it turns out that there are no such distributive 
consequences, then aforementioned considerations of simplicity would favor a 
consumption tax. The benefit of the income tax system was that it was supposed 
to bring about distributive justice at the price of this added complexity, but if the 
taxation of capital income has no effects on distribution, then we will have paid 
the coin of complexity to purchase nothing at all. 
II. LUCK EGALITARIANISM 
If one looks into an introductory text on tax law, he is likely to come across 
something similar to the following criteria by which we measure the merit of 
different tax policies: efficiency, equity, and simplicity.80 Equity itself is divided 
into two kinds of equity: horizontal equity and vertical equity.81 According to the 
criterion of vertical equity, those with greater ability to pay should bear heavier tax 
burdens than those with lesser ability to pay.82 The starting point that we use to 
measure ability to pay is most often the current tax base of income, but it need not 
be.83 Ability to pay is not obviously synonymous with income and could otherwise 
 
Response to Professor McCaffery, 51 TAX L. REV. 363, 371 (1996); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Fairness and a 
Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 88 HARV. L. REV. 931, 946 (1975). 
79. See generally Evsey D. Domar & Richard A. Musgrave, Proportional Income Taxation and 
Risk-Taking, 58 Q.J. ECON. 388 (1944) (setting out the theory underlying this behavioral response); 
Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between an Income Tax and a Consumption Tax a 
Debate About Risk? Does It Matter?, 47 TAX L. REV. 377 (1992) (teasing out the implications of the 
theory for the question of tax base); David A. Weisbach, The (Non)Taxation of Risk, 58 TAX  
L. REV. 1, 5 (2004) (discussing the assumptions of the theory). The ideas in the accompanying 
paragraph are explored much more in-depth infra in Section IV.A.  
80. GRAETZ ET AL., supra note 46, at 28–31. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 28. 
83. Id. 
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be measured by wealth, earnings potential, etc.84  Horizontal equity is achieved 
when individuals who have the same relevant characteristics, typically the same 
ability to pay, pay the same amount of taxes.85 
Yet these concepts cannot be the whole of thinking about equity. Take, for 
example, the hedonistic utilitarian who claims that taxation ought to, like every 
other legal policy, maximize the sum total of happiness in the world.86 Insofar as 
the government must take a dollar from someone, they must take it from the one 
for whom this would cause the least displeasure. The utilitarian claim is not a 
claim about vertical equity. It does not state anything about how relative ability to 
pay relates to the proper rate of taxation other than to say that the two things are 
unrelated. If the poor man cares not much for money and the wealthy man is 
filled with avarice, then hedonistic utilitarianism demands we tax the poor man 
before the rich man, even though the relative ability to pay is clearly the other way 
around. The utilitarian claim is also not a claim about horizontal equity. For all the 
utilitarian cares, two people with equal ability to pay might pay wildly different 
taxes depending on how much displeasure each gets from loss of wealth. Yet 
surely, the utilitarian thesis is a claim about equity broadly construed, for the 
general concern of equity is to ask how we ought to distribute the benefits and 
burdens of a society amongst its members in the interests of justice. 
The problem with traditional conceptions of vertical equity in tax policy is 
that they are outcome based. On such outcome-based views of tax justice, one’s 
tax liability ought to be based on how “well-off” that person is vis-à-vis his peers, 
a relational feature of the distribution of outcomes.87 Someone with high income, 
wealth, etc. ought to pay greater taxes than someone with low income, wealth,  
etc.88 Yet we know that desert and outcome are crosscutting concepts.89 Some 
wealthy individuals deserve to be poor. Some poor individuals deserve to be 
wealthy. Some wealthy individuals deserve to be wealthy. Some poor individuals 
deserve to be poor.  
Outcome-based theories of justice conflict with ordinary intuitions about 
justice because they ignore the process by which those outcomes arose.90  An 
arsonist setting fire to a stranger’s house and a bystander rescuing a child from a 
burning building may both suffer the outcome of severe burn injuries, but we may 
say that the arsonist deserves such injury while the bystander does not.91 The 
 
84. Id. at 29. 
85. Id. at 28. 
86.  See generally Torbjörn Tännsjö, Classical Hedonistic Utilitarianism, 81  
PHIL. STUD. 97 (1996).  
87. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 153–54 (1974). 
88. GRAETZ ET AL., supra note 46, at 28. 
89. NOZICK, supra note 87, at 154–55. 
90. See id. 
91. Nir Eyal, Egalitarian Justice and Innocent Choice, 2 J. ETHICS & SOC. PHIL. 1, 3–4 (2007) 
(supporting the proposition that it is unjust to let the bystander’s burdens lie where they have fallen). 
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arsonist and the rescuer had the same outcome, but through different processes. 
We may consequently wish to provide a tax credit for the amount of any medical 
bills of rescuers while denying such credit to arsonists. This would be a  
process-based approach to tax policy. Although tax systems generally use  
outcome-based metrics for tax liability, this is permissible as a second-best metric 
when process is hard to measure.92 It may, for instance, be difficult in practice for 
the government to distinguish between rescuers and nonrescuers. 
A. Luck Corrodes Desert 
Luck egalitarianism is part of a process-based approach to justice that 
therefore also does not neatly fit into the boxes of vertical and horizontal equity. 
Luck egalitarianism aims to neutralize the effects of luck, and therefore is 
concerned with whether the process behind an outcome was or was not 
determined by luck. The thesis is driven by the principle that one should not be 
left worse off than others as a result of that which was outside of one’s control.93 
A variety of cases illustrate this intuition. In 2015, sixteen-year-old Hunter Treschl 
was wading in waist-high water off the coast of North Carolina when he was 
suddenly attacked by a shark.94 Instantaneously, his arm was torn off his body.95 
Although Treschl survived the attack, he lost the use of his dominant arm.96 
Surely, it is unjust that Treschl suffered this grave injury. He does not deserve the 
loss of his arm. Treschl suffered a bout of horrendous luck. How chance events 
turn out is by definition outside of our control, and the resultant consequences are 
morally arbitrary. But Treschl is just one of billions whose lives are affected by bad 
luck of one sort or another. Luck is absolutely pervasive. Some die in infancy, 
others stub their toes in the dark. The natural course of life does not distribute 
burdens according to just deserts. And just as bad consequences can be distributed 
by chance, so can good consequences. Having the right sorts of parents, having 
 
92. Those who take process to be an important determinant of justice still concede that the 
government can more easily collect information about market outcome rather than the facts about 
process that matter. ACKERMAN & ALSTOTT, supra note 22, at 97. On that account, we might take an 
outcome-based approach to justice in designing the general tax system (as exemplified by using 
income as the primary metric of outcome in a tax system) and use that as a foundation from which to 
make alterations based on our information about process. See id. at 155–77; Nicholas Barry, 
Reassessing Luck Egalitarianism, 70 J. POL. 136, 146–47, 147 n.36 (2008). This was political 
philosopher John Rawls’s view as well. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 4, at 55 (“Rawls is skeptical 
that there are feasible institutions that could detect the extent to which people’s fortunes are due 
entirely to their choices. That in turn leads him to support the difference principle . . . .”). To the 
extent that we do have insight on the process, however, we should make alterations to the income tax 
to reflect that. Rough justice, as the saying goes, is better than no justice at all. 
93. The general idea is widely held. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
94. Katie Bosland, North Carolina Shark Attack Victim Hunter Treschl ‘Didn’t Feel Anything,’ 
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the right genes, and being in a good day-to-day condition on the most important 
days were all lucky consequences previously discussed in relation to athletes. 
With the general intuitions driving luck egalitarianism in place, we ought to 
examine the contours of the theory. At the margins, two questions are posed. 
First, on what line do we demarcate that which is gained through luck and that 
which is not? For the purposes of applied political philosophy, where it is 
particularly important to be theory neutral, it will suffice to use some common-
sense notion of luck, that which is best defined negatively as the absence of effort 
and control over the results.97 More important for this Article is distinguishing 
between a basic act and the resultant causal consequences as a matter of how 
much luck is involved. 
Save for those who suffer from tragic disability or bind, we typically have 
remarkable control over the movement of our body. Such movements are 
generally undertaken for the purpose of accomplishing some causal result other 
than such movement, so we may consider such bodily movements basic acts. Yet 
we do not have such control over the results of such basic acts. One chooses to 
do some basic act which he believes to have a certain array of possible causal 
consequences; which of those consequences ends up being the causal result of his 
act always depends on factors external to the actor. For example, an arrow’s 
hitting a bullseye, in part, must depend on the absence of a sudden gust of wind. 
The further those consequences ripple away from us, the greater the influence of 
interfering factors, and the less control we have over which result occurs. 
B. Option Luck and Brute Luck 
A second contour question is essential to the agenda-setting of this Article. 
Is all luck unjust or only some? In answering this question, Ronald Dworkin 
famously distinguishes between lucky consequences brought about through a 
“deliberate and calculated gamble,” option luck, and those which were not, brute 
 
97. This definition preempts a possible counterargument that everything is a matter of luck 
since one does not choose whether one is genetically predisposed to contribute a lot of effort. All 
desert theorists must reject hard determinism, the radical view that we are not responsible for any of 
our actions since our actions are all causally determined by events outside of our control (e.g., the 
circumstances of our birth). SADURSKI, supra note 12. By the negative definition of luck, the fact that 
someone was genetically predisposed to contribute lots of effort will not dissolve his desert in the 
outcome of his effort. His genetic predisposition to expend effort does not entail the absence of his 
effort in determining the outcome, and therefore, by definition, the results of his effort are not the 
results of luck. Using more technical language, we may say that the determined by relation is not 
transitive—even if luck determines genetics and genetics determines effort outcome, that does not 
entail that luck determines effort outcome. So long as there was effort, it does not matter what cause 
brought that effort about. The backstop against hard determinism must be placed somewhere, and 
effort and choice arising from one’s character are the best locations to place it. See DAVID LEWIS, 
Evil for Freedom’s Sake?, in PAPERS IN ETHICS AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 101, 109–10 (2000) 
(presenting arguments both for and against this position regarding character and hard determinism). 
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luck.98 The astute reader will recall that this distinction was earlier introduced in 
the context of the genetic makeup of athletes (as brute luck) and the quality of 
their coach (as option luck).99 Dworkin went on to argue that option luck was not 
unjust although brute luck was.100 This Article will argue for and operate under a 
more inclusive conception of justice under which both option luck and brute luck 
are unjust.101 For clarity, I again make explicit here that I intend to use the term 
brute luck egalitarianism to denote the point of view that differential results arising 
only from brute luck are unjust; I intend to use the term luck egalitarianism to 
denote the point of view that differential results of both brute luck and option 
luck are unjust.102 
Dworkin’s aim with this philosophical distinction was to support his thesis 
of resource egalitarianism.103 Suppose we start with an initial equal distribution of 
resources across the members of a society. Even so, events outside of our control 
will befall us as a matter of good or bad luck, thereby making the members 
unequal in outcomes. For example, one might be struck by an unpredictable bolt 
of lightning. When disadvantages result from brute luck, Dworkin argued, justice 
demands they be corrected.104 The fundamental insight was to embed personal 
responsibility within a theory of justice that respects egalitarian values. 105 
Balancing these competing virtues is a central task of modern liberal theories of  
distributive justice.  
Significant ink has been spilled by respected authors to address the issue of 
brute luck in the law from a brute luck egalitarian perspective.106 Often, these 
authors concern themselves with the ideal of equalizing our initial resources or 
opportunities in life—such as genetic makeup, parenting, and education—the 
distribution of which is not a matter of our choice. 107  We might call such 
approaches starting point egalitarianism, for they seek to make equal the starting 
points from which we are able to approach life.108 Comparatively, there has been 
quite little said about the proper response towards option luck. The tax literature 
 
98. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 73. 
99. See supra pp. 3–4.  
100. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 74–78; Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality 
of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 283, 292–99 (1981). 
101 . These arguments will be reasons in favor of luck egalitarianism over brute luck 
egalitarianism. They do not concern the various other conceptions of justice, some of which are 
briefly discussed in Part II. 
102.  See Vallentyne, supra note 23, at 540 n.17 (“It is misleading to call [brute luck 
egalitarianism just] ‘luck egalitarianism,’ since it does not call for equalizing option luck.”). 
103. Barry, supra note 92, at 137. 
104. DWORKIN, supra note 6. 
105. G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906, 933 (1989). 
106. For the literature specifically on brute luck and taxation, see sources cited supra note 26. 
107.  For an illuminating discussion of such a framework in relation to tax law, see 
ACKERMAN & ALSTOTT, supra note 22. 
108. For a helpful discussion of the distinction between brute luck egalitarianism and starting 
point egalitarianism, see Vallentyne, supra note 23, at 538–39. 
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lacks a thorough inquiry into the philosophical foundations and the applications of 
neutralizing option luck. Thus, my aim in this Article is to set out in systematic 
fashion both the theory of distributive justice underlying these ideas as well as 
how society can use the institutions of tax law to correct for the injustice brought 
about by differential option luck. 
Before getting to any normative matters about the right political response 
towards option luck, some exposition, beginning with standard examples, will 
make the idea of option luck easier to work with. A standard example of brute 
luck is genetics and their resulting influence on one’s phenotype. Mutation in the 
HBB gene, for instance, causes sickle cell disease. 109  Whether one has this 
mutation is a matter of brute luck. Other standard examples include the quality of 
one’s parents and the country in which one is born. The standard examples of 
option luck, on the other hand, are riding a motorcycle without a helmet, 
purchasing a lottery ticket, and the like. The question of theory is whether these 
categories are distinct in kind and, if so, the nature of that distinction and its role 
in distributive justice. 
As a short motto, Dworkin’s “deliberate and calculated gamble” phrasing 
describes the idea behind option luck with some degree of success.110 At least on 
the surface, the motto can work to split the prototypical cases just laid out along 
the appropriate lines. When one purchases a lottery ticket at the bodega, he surely 
makes a deliberate gamble. If he has full information, then it is also calculated. The 
same surely cannot be said of one’s having the HBB gene mutation that causes 
sickle cell disease. One cannot point to the presence of any deliberate or calculated 
gamble on the part of the patient who has sickle cell disease that led to his status 
as such. Yet, the success is a limited one, for what it is to be deliberate and 
calculated is itself quite vague. For instance, how are we to classify the cases in 
which the individual is unaware of the fact that the action he is considering has a 
certain risk attached to it? 
Dworkin, thankfully, attempts to provide further exposition of the vague 
motto. Option luck, per Dworkin, is the result of “accepting an isolated risk he or 
she should have anticipated and might have declined.”111 What is most striking of 
this exposition is how broadly he draws the boundaries of what it takes for a 
gamble to be deliberate and calculated. Dworkin explicitly includes as deliberate 
not only those risks that the individual knew about, but also those risks that the 
individual should have anticipated. 112  And similar to the idea of negligence 
implicating fault in tort and criminal law, this entails that an individual is 
 
109. Martin H. Steinberg, Overview of Sickle Cell Anemia Pathophysiology, in SICKLE CELL 
ANEMIA: FROM BASIC SCIENCE TO CLINICAL PRACTICE 49, 49 (Fernando Ferreira Costa & Nicola 
Conran eds., 2016). 
110. DWORKIN, supra note 22, at 73. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
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responsible for the outcomes of his actions even if he was completely unaware of 
the risk entailed, so long as that unknown risk should have been known.113 
This broad definition of option luck leads to the first counterargument to 
the brute luck egalitarian position. Pace Dworkin, responsibility and desert require 
some conscious mental state by the actor of the outcome.114  This is why we 
ordinarily take ignorance of the relevant facts to be a standard excuse to 
responsibility.115 On any sensible notion of responsibility and desert, one cannot 
be responsible for outcomes that never crossed one’s mind. Even on Dworkin’s 
own terms, it is quite puzzling how one could be acting in a “deliberate and 
calculated” manner with regard to a risk when he is unaware of that risk.116 Having 
the wrong information seems straightforwardly antithetical to the idea of a 
calculated gamble. The fault of negligence regards accidents, not deliberate acts.117 
When the concepts of option luck and brute luck are subjected to close 
scrutiny, their supposed relation to desert falls apart.118 Both option luck and brute 
luck create unjust outcomes. 119  The remainder of Part II presents further 
arguments in favor of luck egalitarianism, particularly in contrast to brute  
luck egalitarianism, and brings definition to the boundaries of the luck  
egalitarian theory.  
Closely examined at the level of case intuition, brute luck egalitarianism’s 
harsh stance on victims of bad option luck is hard to stomach. Return to the case 
of Hunter Treschl.120  Suppose that Hunter knew that there was some minute 
probability of a shark attack if he chose to go for a swim that day. Presumably, this 
is the case for most of us when we go for a swim at the beach. Despite the risk, 
Hunter decided to wade out into the water only to suffer the catastrophic shark 
attack. Hunter’s injury, by definition, resulted from option luck. Does the fact that 
 
113. Matt King, The Problem with Negligence, 35 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 577, 587 (2009) 
(“[N]egligence is defined by a lack of conscious mental states, an unconscious inattention, and there 
need be no choices or decisions that contribute to that inattention.”). The theoretical underpinnings 
of negligence and responsibility are discussed more generally in H.L.A. HART, Negligence, Mens Rea, 
and Criminal Responsibility, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW 136, 136 (2d ed. 2008); Michael S. Moore & Heidi M. Hurd, Punishing the Awkward, the Stupid, 
the Weak, and the Selfish: The Culpability of Negligence, 5 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 147, 147–48 (2011). 
114. King, supra note 113, at 579. 
115. Id. 
116. This idea is developed further in King, supra note 113, at 578–82, and also in Moore  
& Hurd, supra note 113, at 147–48. 
117. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
118.  In the philosophy literature, this position has been argued by Barry, supra note 92,  
at 145–46. 
119. This version of luck egalitarianism is consistent with, though not identical to, theories of 
distributive justice, which take effort or sacrifice as the proper basis for desert. A well-developed 
example of such a theory is presented in SADURSKI, supra note 12, at 116–57. Whereas the effort-basis 
views are positive theories of desert, outlining what matters for desert, luck egalitarianism is a negative 
theory of desert outlining what does not matter for desert. 
120. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
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he acted with knowledge of the risk justify Hunter’s loss of limb? Is his bad luck 
deserved insofar as it was a risk taken on knowingly? Surely not. Intuitively, 
Treschl’s loss of limb is the kind of bad luck he does not deserve to bear whether 
he knew the risk before going to the beach or not.121 That he, rather than any 
other swimmer that day, was bitten was morally arbitrary. The brute luck 
egalitarian conclusion that Hunter’s tragic situation comports with justice is at 
odds with common sense. 
Just as there is bad option luck, there is good option luck. It is a common 
refrain of tax academics that the tax system must have some way to reach into the 
pockets of people like Bill Gates.122 Inequality between the most well-off and the 
least well-off members of society has exploded since the 1970s, and the tax system 
plays a critical role in the redistribution of economic outcomes.123 But it is hard to 
see how a brute luck theorist like Dworkin would be able to justify much of a tax 
on the wealthy at all. One reason that Bill Gates is wealthy is that he took multiple 
deliberate and calculated gambles that turned out in his favor. Gates’s wealth is 
partly a matter of option luck.124 
If two people both have an equal shot of winning a competition that they 
voluntarily entered, then no matter how well the winner does or how poorly the 
loser does, brute luck egalitarianism cannot distinguish among them as a matter of 
justice. The results of such a competition are, by definition, not the results of 
brute luck. That means that if a competitor of Bill Gates had an ex ante identical 
chance of winning the race for software dominance as Gates did, then even if that 
competitor ends up destitute and Bill Gates ends up absurdly wealthy, brute luck 
egalitarianism cannot justify taxing the two individuals differently on that basis. 
In Section III.A, infra, I discuss the research in economics that supports and 
explains the role of option luck in creating massive gaps in wealth. For now, 
consider the following half-fantastical thought experiment. Suppose that at the 
time of Bill Gates’s birth, 100 children with the same amount of brute luck as 
Gates were also born. These 100 “brute luck equivalents” had roughly the same 
natural talents, roughly the same childhood upbringing, none are killed by 
unexpected earthquakes, etc. Let us further stipulate that all brute luck equivalents 
also exert roughly the same effort into their well-being. Would all 100 equivalents 
achieve a level of success equal to founding Microsoft? Surely not. 
 
121. For a similar objection and further discussion, see Marc Fleurbaey, Equal Opportunity or 
Equal Social Outcome?, 11 ECON. & PHIL. 25, 40 (1995). This objection is sometimes called the 
harshness objection. E.g., Kristin Voigt, The Harshness Objection: Is Luck Egalitarianism Too Harsh on 
the Victims of Option Luck?, 10 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 389, 390 (2007).  
122. See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 56, at 97. 
123. Piketty et al., supra note 43. 
124. See Alstott, supra note 26, at 500. For now, I make no suppositions of whether Gates’s 
income is from labor or capital. 
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In fact, it is naturally plausible that some of those lives may turn out to be 
quite average. Let us suppose that one equivalent, despite his brute luck 
advantages in life, ends up (as a matter of option luck) struggling with alcoholism 
and a job that pays a yearly salary of $50,000. 
Recall that, for the brute luck egalitarian, only differential results of brute 
luck are unjust. If two people with the same amount of brute luck earn divergent 
rewards in the marketplace, then the one with bad outcomes has no claim of 
unfairness against the one with good outcomes.125 By stipulation, Bill Gates and 
his alcoholic brute luck equivalent had the same amount of brute luck. The brute 
luck theorist is therefore committed to the position that the two should bear the 
same tax liability, lest they violate horizontal equity on their own terms.126 What is 
the amount of tax liability that can be imposed on both individuals that will make 
a dent in Bill Gates’s wealth without suffocating the alcoholic brute luck 
equivalent? There is none. For instance, we could impose an annual tax liability of 
$50,000 on both of them, but it would only leave the brute luck equivalent 
destitute while making absolutely no difference to Gates. For brute luck 
egalitarianism to justify significant taxes on Gates, it must turn out to be the case 
that everyone who had as much brute luck as Gates ended up at least within the 
same financial ballpark so that they could bear the same tax burden as Gates 
without being suffocated by it.  
But how likely is it that everyone who had as much luck as Gates ended up 
being similarly successful? Because there are so many members in our society, 
there are likely several who have had as much brute luck as Gates. Even if one 
thinks that Bill Gates had such spectacular brute luck that he is in the brute 
luckiest top 0.001% of the population, in our United States population of 328 
million people, that would still mean that there are more than 3,000 others who 
had just as much brute luck.127 Furthermore, economic inequality is so steep at the 
top that extremely few could be considered within Gates’s financial ballpark. 
Currently, Gates has a net worth of $111 billion (and Jeff Bezos has a net worth of 
$179 billion) while the 25th wealthiest American has a net worth of “only” $17 
billion.128 Thus, we see that it does not take much to be comparatively much 
poorer than Bill Gates. Putting these premises together, there is almost certainly at 
 
125. Vallentyne, supra note 23, at 547. 
126. See Marc Fleurbaey, Egalitarian Opportunities, 20 LAW & PHIL. 499, 506 (2001); Barbara 
H. Fried, Ex Ante/Ex Post, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 123, 160 (2003); Vallentyne, supra note 
23, at 550 (“Brute luck egalitarians, that is, have tended to endorse something like the following 
principle of accountability: . . . If, prior to any coercive transfers, two agents are identical with respect 
to the factors for which justice requires equalization, then justice requires that the two agents have the 
same coercive transfers (e.g., taxes or subsidies).”).  
127. QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/
PST045218 [https://perma.cc/3EST-FLG9]  ( last visited Aug. 4, 2019). 
128.  The Definitive Ranking of the Wealthiest Americans in 2020, FORBES, https://
www.forbes.com/forbes-400/ [https://perma.cc/4BWS-LLNL] ( last visited Mar. 27, 2021). 
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least one person who had at least as much brute luck as Bill Gates and ended up 
doing much worse financially than Gates. Brute luck egalitarianism entails that 
either the person who is doing much worse than Gates must be imposed an 
insanely high tax liability (to get at the wealth of Bill Gates) or that we ought not 
tax Bill Gates very much at all (to prevent overburdening the person doing much 
worse than Gates). Brute luck egalitarianism is stuck between Scylla and 
Charybdis, and the ship must be abandoned. 
In response, a critic of luck egalitarianism might pose to me a similarly 
structured counterargument. Suppose that we have set up a society in which only 
effort determines one’s economic outcomes. Suppose further that the competition 
for software dominance involved no luck at all, but still could result in just one 
winner. Gates, again the winner, expended 101 units of effort and Competitor 
expended 100 units of effort. Wouldn’t luck egalitarianism be unequipped to tax 
Gates and Competitor differently on such facts no matter how wealthy Gates is? 
A few things can be said about such a criticism. First, one should note that, 
to the extent this may be a problem, the same problem applies with equal force to 
brute luck egalitarianism as well. As the problem assumes away luck, brute luck 
egalitarian justice requires no redistribution.129 Thus, the criticism is no way to 
distinguish between the two central views at stake here. Second, a hard-liner who 
takes the equalization of luck as not only necessary but also sufficient for a just 
society should respond that once one sees what is going on in such a scenario, any 
trouble disappears. If Competitor had chosen to put in two more units of effort, 
he would have won. Ex hypothesi, Competitor knew how much effort Gates was 
putting in; if he didn’t know, then it would have been a matter of chance, from 
Competitor’s perspective, whether he or Gates put in more effort by the end of 
the competition, thereby contradicting our starting supposition. Once we tease out 
these facts about a luck-neutral society, the criticism does not seem too tough a 
pill to swallow. If Competitor knew he was going to lose and decided that the 
additional units of effort were not worth the benefits of winning the competition, 
then it seems to me at least not objectionable to say that Competitor has no claim 
for any part of Gates’s winnings from the race. Third, one could take the 
equalization of luck as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a just 
distribution of benefits and burdens. If one further thinks that outcomes should 
be distributed in proportion to effort for sufficiency, then Competitor does have a 
claim against Gates if he ends up with nothing and Gates ends up rich. Such a 
distribution would not be in proportion to effort. That the equalization of option 
luck is merely necessary for a just distribution will motivate the policy arguments 
of this Article and is the primary distinction against the brute luck egalitarians, 
who deny that the equalization of option luck is necessary.130  
 
129. See text accompanying note 102. 
130. See supra note 119. 
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C. Defining the Boundaries of Luck Egalitarianism 
Positive arguments like those above are important touchstones for thinking 
about issues of justice. We must also consequently ask whether there is some line 
of reasoning to demonstrate that the pull to find option luck as unjust is 
misleading. Dworkin himself proposes two candidates that might play this role. 
The first candidate counterexample to my thesis that both brute and option luck 
ought to be neutralized is premised on the idea of gambles as a desired activity, 
which would be ruined by a system of redistribution.131 Surely, if a man goes into a 
casino to play multiple rounds of roulette, it would serve no liberal purpose for 
the government to step in and redistribute all earnings such that the man leaves 
the casino with exactly the amount with which he came in. Gambler walks up to 
the table, plops down $100 on red, the dealer takes his chip, spins the roulette, the 
ball lands in a hole, the government gives Gambler back his $100, and everyone 
has wasted their time. In such a world, no one would play roulette. Such a system 
of redistribution would “deprive both [the winner and the loser] of lives they 
prefer.” 132  Luck neutralization for the casino gambler is nonsense. I 
wholeheartedly agree. One exception to the general rule that luck leads to unjust 
inequalities is when risk is what makes the activity good.133 Risk can be an end 
rather than a means. For certain choices, the risk attached is not a cost to be 
stomached in pursuit of some other benefit, but risk itself is the benefit sought 
after. Gambling in a casino is at times an example of the latter.134 
One heuristic to determine whether the risk is a benefit or a cost is to ask 
whether the agent making the choice in a state of ideal reasoning would accept or 
decline the offer to perfectly insure against the risk for “free” so that he ends up 
with the expected value of the gamble no matter what.135  The gambler, I am 
certain, would actively reject the insurance. All the insurance would do is 
guarantee that he loses five cents on every dollar he bets on roulette.136 The risk 
of loss is what makes the act of gambling enjoyable.137 The risk, as such, is the 
thing desired rather than a cost one bears to achieve some other good. I suspect 
that other decisions, such as skydiving or drag racing, may be similar. Contrast this 
 
131. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 75. 
132. Id. 
133.  See Barry, supra note 92, at 138 (focusing on when a participant chooses a  
gamble proper). 
134. See also DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 95–96 (noting that some gambling is explained by 
“value to uncertainty for its own sake,” while acknowledging there are other explanations for 
gambling as well). 
135. Barry, supra note 92, at 138–39. 
136. This is the expected value of all bets in roulette, with the exception of the top line or 
basket bets, which have an expected value of negative eight cents on the dollar. Roulette,  
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roulette#Bet_odds_table [https://perma.cc/K5UB-SJP8] 
( last visited Oct. 24, 2019). 
137. “The sole purpose of gambling . . . is to convert a sure thing . . . into a risky bet.” Fried, 
supra note 126, at 144. 
First to Printer_Nam.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/14/21  7:17 AM 
2021]  TAXING OPTION LUCK 1093 
to the risk a law firm associate takes by devoting thousands of hours to specialize 
in a complex area of law (such as tax law) that Congress may a few years later 
decide to radically simplify, thereby eliminating demand for sophisticated experts. 
For her, the risk attached to her investment in specialization is an unavoidable 
cost rather than the thing sought after. She takes on the risk only as a means, not 
as an end. 
By levying the criticism of desired gambling, the critic has, in some sense, got 
the right idea. I must revise my earlier principle. Not all outcomes determined by 
luck are unjust. Upon pressure by the gambling counterexample, I must concede 
that there is no injustice in allowing those who desired the risk of loss to bear the 
losses that they risked. Whereas Dworkin thought that a gamble being deliberate 
and calculated was sufficient to make the results just, I take it that one must 
actually desire the risk of a gamble (as marked by rejecting the offer to insure) in 
order for the results to be just.138  
A second counterargument against the position that option luck is unjust is 
that it would be unfair to let those who willingly partake in risky ventures, even if 
partaken despite the risk, lay their burdens against those who chose to lead lives of 
safety.139 To illustrate, we can again return to Hunter Treschl deciding to wade 
into waist-high waters off the coast of North Carolina. There does indeed seem to 
be some injustice if the government comes to collect money for Treschl’s medical 
bills from those individuals who abstained from the pleasures of swimming 
precisely to guard against the risk of a shark attack. The person who stayed at 
home due to his fear of sharks has already paid the price of not being able to enjoy 
a nice swim. Again, I agree wholeheartedly with the critic. However, unlike the 
first counterargument, I do not take this second one to require a reformation of 
the luck egalitarian principle to exclude certain luck corrections. Instead, it 
requires a clarification about how the luck egalitarian program ought to proceed. 
Luck egalitarianism can sidestep the concern of unfairly burdening the safe actors 
by keeping risk within the pool of people who have taken identical or near-
identical risks as opposed to equalizing outcomes between risk-takers and non-
 
138.  The discussion on gambling reinforces the idea that luck egalitarianism is not  
a paternalistic theory. Paternalist government action corrects for the short-sightedness of  
individuals—when an individual desires something that is not good for them. Luck egalitarianism has 
nothing to say about whether gambling in a casino is good for the gambler and, therefore, has no 
paternalistic reason to prohibit individuals from gambling. Luck egalitarianism is concerned purely 
with the justice of a distribution of benefits and burdens. Luck egalitarianism is not itself paternalistic, 
but is neither incompatible with paternalism. The administration of government requires principles 
outside of distributive justice, and these other principles, whatever they may be, might require 
limitations on gambling. Dworkin also thought that principles outside of brute luck egalitarianism 
would justify placing limitations on hazardous gambling. See DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 75; Ronald 
Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue Revisited, 113 ETHICS 106, 114–15 (2002). 
139. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 74. 
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risk-takers. 140  We might call such corrections the neutralization of intraclass 
differential luck.141 
In this Part, I have laid out the normative framework of luck egalitarianism 
and sketched a defense of the view that differential option luck ought to be 
neutralized within the risk class. This Article seeks not only to defend luck 
egalitarianism, but also to analyze tax law from its perspective. In some sense, the 
picture I have laid out in this Part is an ideal picture. As with many issues of 
distributive justice, figuring out how our legal institutions can effect these visions 
will require compromise away from the ideal given our limitations in information, 
ability, and transaction costs. 
III. POLICY 
A. Taxing the Rich 
The practical limitations of information, ability, and transaction costs, along 
with some conceptual concerns, will lead to what may aptly be called 
implementation problems. Implementation problems arise due to the fact that laws 
must be written and enforced by human beings following some general rule of law 
principles. Whereas the conceptual issues with luck egalitarianism concerned what 
would be the best way to distribute benefits and burdens if we could distribute 
them in any way we wanted, the implementation problems deal with whether we 
can, in fact, distribute benefits and burdens in the way our best theoretical 
account demands. We have a theory which, at an abstract level, dictates who gets 
what; now how do we design the concrete legal institutions to do that? In this 
Part, I deal with the principal implementation problem of information and how 
two tax policies, taxing capital income and taxing the rich, get around the problem. 
As usual, it will be easier to grasp these problems through examining a 
particular proposal. Consider the apparent flaws in the most straightforward 
 
140. Barry, supra note 92, at 146. In effect, this amounts to requiring individuals to insure 
against risk taken on as a means. (Recall that risk taken on as an end need not be equalized.) Any 
theory of justice must limit freedoms that would violate that theory of justice upon exercise. For 
instance, brute luck egalitarians must limit the freedom to give large inheritances to children insofar  
as doing so would upset any equality of brute luck. See Barbara Fried, Wilt Chamberlain  
Revisited: Nozick’s “Justice in Transfer” and the Problem of Market-Based Distribution, 24  
PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 226, 235 (1995). 
141. This theoretical reformation leads to an interesting consequence regarding insurance in 
the private marketplace. Since people who have chosen to purchase insurance are in a different risk 
class than those who have not chosen to purchase insurance, the government’s neutralization of 
intraclass risk works as a kind of default public option for insurance. Under an ideal luck 
neutralization system, those who have not insured against a risk are de facto insured by the 
government’s neutralization of their luck. But this does not mean that there is no role for private 
insurance. If private insurers can carry out the task more efficiently than the government, then this 
cost-saving can be split for the benefit of purchasers of private insurance and thereby provides reason 
to purchase private insurance. 
First to Printer_Nam.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/14/21  7:17 AM 
2021]  TAXING OPTION LUCK 1095 
application of luck egalitarian principles in tax law: a 100% tax on all lucky 
income. The principal limitation on creating a luck egalitarian tax seems to be the 
information problem. The theory dictates that society distribute benefits and 
burdens so as to remove the effects of luck, and a 100% tax on lucky income 
would, ideally, accomplish that goal. But how would such a rule be enforced in 
practice? It is difficult, as a matter of empirical inquiry, to determine how much of 
one’s income (understood in the broad Haig-Simons sense) is a matter of luck and 
how much is a matter of effort.142 That is why Congress could not simply legislate 
for there to be a 100% tax on all lucky income. Tax compliance would require a 
tremendous amount of information about luck and its effects that we just do not 
have. Whether the determinants of our income are a matter of chance is an 
empirical inquiry, and it would be unreasonable for the governing body, much less 
individual taxpayers, to have to perform that investigation for all taxable income. 
Grounded in the plausible premise that the income tax has been working 
passably well thus far, we might then respond to the information problem by 
taking a conservative approach that hews closely to the current regime of income 
taxation. 143  There are two ways to conservatively approach luck egalitarian 
revisions to the tax code. First, we might limit changes to areas where we are fairly 
confident luck plays a role. If we have great confidence that there is some 
substantial amount of luck involved in Olympic victory, to make use of a previous 
example, we should levy additional taxes on Olympic victories first. Second, we 
might simply have a more conservative tax rate than what we think justice 
demands in those areas where we are uncertain about the effects of luck. If we 
have .5 credence that 30% of Group X’s income is determined by luck and .5 
credence that 15% of Group X’s income is determined by luck, for example, then 
a conservative approach would be to tax them in a way that neutralizes just 15% 
of their income. Both tactics, as is the mark of conservative tax policies, must 
purchase the security that those we are taxing do indeed deserve to be taxed, at the 
cost of undertaxing people who deserve a heavier tax burden. 
There is both theoretical and empirical research in social science, typically 
economics, on the role luck plays in societal outcomes. One consistent line of 
such research shows that we can be confident that the most well-off members of 
society are so well-off partly as a matter of luck. This result is explained by two 
factors. First, the development of technology has created winner-take-all markets 
in which winners of market competition obtain vast riches. Second, given the size 
of such global markets, winning market competitions with the highest prizes 
almost certainly requires some element of luck. 
 
142. This is a problem for the effects of both brute luck and option luck. See ACKERMAN  
& ALSTOTT, supra note 22, at 97. 
143.  The idea of income tax as a second-best solution is discussed supra note 92 and 
accompanying text. 
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Modern developments in technology, broadly construed, have created the 
opportunity for large disparities in pecuniary rewards with respect to small 
differences in performance. 144  Take, for example, advances in transportation. 
When shipping costs were high, manufacturers could exercise monopolistic power 
over their local regions since distant competitors had difficulty providing their 
goods in the local market. 145  As the technology for transportation improved, 
shipping costs decreased, thus diminishing the monopolistic power of local 
manufacturers.146 The best producers, who need only have the slightest edge over 
their competitors, could now capture the entire industry’s income regardless of 
where buyers were located while their competitors floundered. 147  Other 
developments akin to transportation include lower tariff barriers and rapid 
developments in communication technology, including the Internet.148  Overall, 
such developments in technology have led to winner-take-all markets, markets in 
which performance relative to competitors is critical and payoffs are radically 
concentrated at the top.149 
As competition for the large payouts at the top slots of winner-take-all 
markets grows more intense, we can have confidence that the winners are 
beneficiaries of luck. The reason why winning intense competitions with a wide 
competitor base requires luck was alluded to earlier in the discussion of placing 
first in the Olympics.150 At the highest levels of competition, almost everything 
needs to go right in order for a competitor to win.151 Part of that everything will 
be a matter of luck. That is why world records for events such as the 100-meter 
dash are almost always set with the help of tailwinds.152 Of course, none of this is 
to say that effort is not a major part of the equation. But as the pool of 
competitors increases, there will be more and more people who put in almost as 
much effort as the person who ends up putting in the most effort, and it will be a 
matter of luck which of those people end up winning the competition. Since 
competitors choose to enter such competitions, the results are, at least partly, a 
matter of option luck. 
One common way of getting a better grasp of the role of luck is to use 
mathematical models embedding different assumptions about how such 
competitions might work.153 When we look at the results of such simulations, it 
 
144.  ROBERT H. FRANK, SUCCESS AND LUCK: GOOD FORTUNE AND THE MYTH OF 
MERITOCRACY 40–55 (2016).  
145. See id. at 42. 
146. Id.  
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 42–44. 
149. Id. at 42–46. 
150. See supra Introduction. 
151. FRANK, supra note 144, at 63. 
152. See INT’L ASS’N OF ATHLETICS FED’NS, IAAF WORLD ATHLETICS CHAMPIONSHIPS 
DOHA 2019: STATISTICS HANDBOOK 680–81 (Mark Butler ed., 2019). 
153. See, e.g., Alessandro Pluchino, Alessio Emanuele Biondo & Andrea Rapisarda, Talent 
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turns out that the role of luck is quite robust. One example of such a model 
illuminating the aforementioned intuition about luck in competition is described 
by the economist Robert H. Frank: 
[W]hichever contestant has the highest total performance score wins the 
contest. Performance, in turn, depends in varying degrees on talent, 
effort, and luck. One of the simulations examines a baseline case with 
100,000 contestants and in which luck counts for only 2 percent of total 
performance. The remaining 98 percent is accounted for in equal parts by 
ability and effort. Each contestant’s ability, effort, and luck values are 
independently drawn random numbers that are equally likely to lie 
anywhere between 0 and 100. The average luck score of contest winners 
in that simulation is 90.23, and 78.1 percent of winners did not have the 
highest combined total of talent and effort values.154  
Even in a model in which luck is stipulated to determine just 2% of the 
performance, the winners of the competition had an average luck score of 90.155 
Since luck was distributed uniformly in these simulations, the luck score represents 
the percentage of the population that had less luck than that individual. That 
means the winners, on average, had more luck than 90% of their competitors. In a 
variant of the model in which the role of luck was stipulated to determine 10% of 
performance, the average luck score of winners went up to 97.156 
Such analysis gives us some confidence in the proposition that the most  
well-off members of society, whether their wealth was won in the marketplace or 
as inheritance, were beneficiaries of good fortune.157 Furthermore, the analysis 
should not be considered as standing alone, as it also accords with other evidence 
that the most well-off have been beneficiaries of luck.158 Since the differential 
results of luck are unjust, luck egalitarianism provides a positive reason for laying 
 
Versus Luck: The Role of Randomness in Success and Failure, 21 ADVANCES COMPLEX SYS., July 27, 
2018, at 1, 5–7. 
154. FRANK, supra note 144, at 65–66. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 156 fig.A1.1. 
157. The proposition includes a disjunction. I have argued for one of the disjuncts—that 
concerning wealth won in the marketplace. I take it the second disjunct is widely agreed upon since 
the features of one’s parents are largely outside of one’s control. See ERIC RAKOWSKI, EQUAL 
JUSTICE 159–60 (1991). 
158.  E.g., Lily Batchelder & David Kamin, Policy Options for Taxing the Rich, in 
MAINTAINING THE STRENGTH OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM 200, 201 (Melissa S. Kearney & Amy 
Ganz eds., 2019) (noting that economic outcomes are determined by factors such as race and parents’ 
economic advantage); Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The 
Ones Without Principals Are, 116 Q.J. ECON. 901, 902 (2001) (finding that when companies earn 
extra revenue from luck, CEOs will capture some of those profits as compensation for themselves); 
Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259, 276 (1983) (“The 
empirical evidence shows that inherited wealth accounts for at least half the net worth of wealthy men 
and for most of the net worth of wealthy women. Enormous one-shot gains explain most of the 
remainder of the significant wealth advantages of the truly rich.”). 
First to Printer_Nam.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/14/21  7:17 AM 
1098 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:1067 
an additional tax burden on the most well-off members of society. 159  By 
definition, such a tax scheme would be a progressive tax scheme. 
In this way, luck egalitarianism, by accounting for the differential results of 
option luck, diverges in tax policy implications from brute luck egalitarianism. As 
discussed in Section II.B, brute luck egalitarianism cannot justify a greater tax on 
the winners of a chancy competition if the entrants of the competition each had 
an equal shot at winning. Luck egalitarianism, which does not distinguish between 
option luck and brute luck, requires taxing the winners of such competitions 
differently. Given that technological advances increasingly widen the divide 
between the winners and losers of market competition, this distinction between 
the rival theories is of critical importance. 
B. A Tax on Capital Income and the Neutralization Thesis 
There is another arena in which we are quite confident that elements of luck 
are embedded. On the modern understanding of finance, the real  
(inflation-adjusted) return on market-priced investment can be decomposed into 
the following constituent parts.160 First, investments require investors to defer the 
use of their income for consumption, and they must therefore be compensated for 
their waiting.161 This rate of return is unrelated to risk or is risk free. The prime 
example of a nearly riskless asset (without risk premium) is a U.S. Treasury 
bond.162 Given that the United States has essentially no default risk, all of the 
return on the asset is certain.163 
The second and third components of investment returns are tied to  
risk-bearing. Most investment options are not riskless in the way that Treasury 
bonds are. In these alternative cases, investors are being paid to take on the risk a 
seller will offload. It is helpful to think of the returns to risk-bearing as having two 
 
159. The implications of winner-take-all markets for progressive taxation have been discussed 
in non-luck egalitarian contexts. See, e.g., Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Alice G. Abreu, Winner-Take-All 
Markets: Easing the Case for Progressive Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 10 (1998) (arguing for 
progressive taxation on grounds of economic efficiency and welfarism); Neil H. Buchanan, The Case 
Against Income Averaging, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1151, 1214–16 (2006). 
160. Shaviro, supra note 56, at 101. None of the four candidate tax bases include inflation 
since inflation is not income, consumption, wealth, or wage. Although many investments might leave 
opportunity to collect above-market returns by being underpriced (and the investor knows that it is 
underpriced), it is not clear how such gains would relate to luck. It appears that it would depend on 
how the investor came to know that the asset was underpriced and to what extent that process 
involved effort. See Fried, supra note 26, at 394. For the purpose of this Article, I assume all assets are 
correctly priced by the market, and there are no above-market returns to be had. As an empirical 
matter, estimates of the availability of such returns are sparse. Weisbach, supra note 47, at 606 n.12. 
161. Shaviro, supra note 56, at 101. 
162.  See David F. Bradford, Consumption Taxes: Some Fundamental Transition Issues, in 
FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 123, 128–29 (Michael J. Boskin ed., 1996). 
163. See Stephen M. Penner, Note, International Investment and the Prudent Investor Rule: The 
Trustee’s Duty to Consider International Investment Vehicles, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 601, 629 (1995). 
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components: ex ante and ex post.164 The ex ante component, the risk premium, is 
the amount the buyer of risk is compensated for his assuming additional risk 
before the risk plays out.165 The ex post component is the amount gained or lost 
by virtue of the risk playing out.166 
It is easiest to conceptualize these components of returns to risk-bearing 
with an example. Suppose Larry, because of the particularities of his business, 
knows that there is a .5 probability that he will suffer a $5 loss tomorrow and a .5 
probability that he will gain $5 tomorrow. Although the expected dollar value of 
the possible events is $0 (the sum of the products of possible outcomes and their 
probabilities of occurrence),167 because Larry is risk averse, he prefers a certainty 
of getting $0 tomorrow rather than the win or lose probabilistic event. Thus, he 
arranges a deal with John in which John, in effect, insures Larry against risk—if 
Larry suffers the bad outcome, John will pay him $4; if Larry gets the good 
outcome, Larry will pay John $6. No matter what happens, Larry will have net $1 
less tomorrow than he does today.168 Essentially, Larry has agreed to pay John $1 
tomorrow in order to secure certainty about the future and have John bear all of 
the risk instead. John gets the $1 payment of ex ante return no matter what; his ex 
post return will be either a gain of $5 or a loss of $5. 
Although returns to most, or perhaps all, investments have both riskless and 
risk-related components, it is important as a conceptual matter to understand the 
decomposition between the two types of return. For risky assets, given the fact 
that what one is being paid for is to bear risk, two people who bore the same risk 
may end up in wildly different positions through no fault of their own.169 As an 
analytic matter, this is precisely the imposition of chance that they are being paid 
to bear. Suppose, to add to the previous hypothetical, that Mary, operating a 
completely unrelated venture, faces an independent but identical probabilistic 
distribution of outcomes as Larry. Mary pays Sean $1 to bear this risk using the 
same deal structure Larry and John had. Naturally, since Mary’s venture is 
independent of Larry’s, it could be that Larry gets the good outcome tomorrow 
while Mary gets the bad outcome. Given their insurance contracts, Sean would be 
down $4 while John would be up $6. By events outside of their control, there was 
a $10 disparity of income created between two people who took the same risks. 
 
164. Shaviro, supra note 56, at 101. 
165. See id. 
166. See id. 
167. ($5 * 50%) + (-$5 * 50%) = 0. 
168. In the bad outcome, his ledger is: -$5 + $4 = -$1. In the good outcome, his ledger is: $5 
– $6 = -$1. 
169. Graetz, supra note 17, at 1601. 
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Luck egalitarianism places a prima facie burden on the state to neutralize such 
differential luck.170 
Although the above examples used the idea of an insurance contract, 
investment products are not much different. Research on returns to capital 
investment show that most of the returns are comprised of payment for  
risk-bearing because the riskless rate is quite low, hovering near zero.171 Investors 
are paid mostly for their bearing some portion of the investment’s risk and paid 
further upon the risk playing out. And insofar as these investments involve risk, 
investors with identical ex ante positions can end up with wildly different ex post 
outcomes purely as a matter of luck. Given the minor role that riskless rates play, 
differential results among investors are largely the result of luck. In large part, an 
understanding of returns to capital as largely composed of returns to risk-bearing 
quells the first fears of the information problem.  
Let us run through an example of how a tax on investment income would be 
able to create greater equity between two investors who were ex ante identical. 
First, let us make some simplifying assumptions. Suppose that the riskless rate is 0. 
This supposition, which is not far from the truth, will guarantee that the real 
returns on investment will be completely from returns to risk-bearing. Suppose 
further that an individual investor may purchase as much or as little of Greenacre 
and Blackacre as possible. In Period 1, the investments between Greenacre and 
Blackacre are ex ante indistinguishable. From the Period 1 ex ante perspective, 
both investments will either be worth four times the initial investment (the 
winning scenario) or be worthless in Period 2 (the losing scenario), each with .5 
probability occurrence. Ex post, it turns out to be the case that Greenacre gets the 
winning scenario and Blackacre gets the losing scenario. Everyone is risk averse. 
In Period 1, Greg invests $5 in Greenacre, and Barry invests $5 in Blackacre. 
As before, negative numbers are denoted in the tables below by their enclosure in 
parentheses. In a tax system which does not tax returns on investment, the flow of 










170. See supra Section II.A. Sean and John are different from the situation of the casino 
gambler in that they presumably would take “free” insurance if it were offered to them (leaving them 
with the expected value of their bet of $1), whereas a roulette player would not. 
171. Bradford, supra note 162, at 129; Weisbach, supra note 79, at 24. 
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Table 3: Investment in Yield Exemption 
Greenacre 
 Period 1 Period 2 After-tax profit 
Investor (5) 20 15 
Government 0 0 0 
 
Blackacre 
 Period 1 Period 2 After-tax profit 
Investor (5) 0 (5) 
Government 0 0 0 
 
In Period 1, Greg pays $5 to invest. In Period 2, the price of the asset goes 
up to $20. His net profit is $15.172 For Barry, he pays $5 in Period 1 for something 
that declines in value to $0 in Period 2, so his net profit is a loss of $5. This means 
that purely from luck, ex hypothesi, there is created a $20 difference in outcomes 
between the two investors.173 
Now suppose that the investments were made in an income tax system 
which taxes capital income. The tax rate is 50% on all income with full  
loss offsets. 
 
Table 4: Investment in Income Tax 
Greenacre 
 Period 1 Period 2 After-tax profit 
Investor (5) 20 7.5 
Government 0 7.5 7.5 
 
Blackacre 
 Period 1 Period 2 After-tax profit 
Investor (5) 0 (2.5) 
Government 0 (2.5) (2.5) 
 
To purchase a portion of Greenacre, Greg will pay $5 in Period 1. In Period 
2, the investment will be worth $20. In an ideal income tax system (without a 
realization requirement), this represents $15 of income from the investment.174 
Thus, the government will collect a tax of 50% on the income, a total of $7.50. 
 
172. This is the price of the asset in Period 2 minus the price of the asset in Period 1. 
173. $15 – (-$5) = $20. 
174.  See supra Section I.B (discussing the taxation of accretions to wealth in an ideal  
income tax). 
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After everything is said and done, the government will end up with a net profit of 
$7.50 from the tax on Greg, and Greg will end up with an after-tax profit of $7.50 
which accounts for the money he had to pay in taxes and the money he used to 
purchase the investment. 175  Unfortunately for Barry, he will end up with a 
worthless asset in Period 2. Again, in an ideal income tax, since Barry has a loss of 
$5 on his investment, 50% of that will be paid to him by the government as a loss 
offset.176  In an ideal income tax, just as positive income leads to positive tax 
liability (i.e., obligation of the taxpayer to pay the government) at the income tax 
rate, a loss or negative income leads to negative tax liability (i.e., obligation of the 
government to pay the taxpayer) at the income tax rate. 177  Therefore, the 
government loses $2.50 on the taxation of Barry in Period 2, and Barry gains 
$2.50.178 This leaves Barry with an after-tax loss of just $2.50.179 The differential 
effects of luck on Barry and Greg have been reduced to a divide of just $10 in the 
income tax system.180 
In this example, an income tax reduced the difference between Greg and 
Barry by $10 compared to the system in which there was no tax on the yield from 
investments. This is because the income tax makes those who have income worse 
off and those who lose income better off. Thus, the income tax can play the role 
of neutralizing intraclass differential luck. Call this the Neutralization Thesis. 
NEUTRALIZATION THESIS: A tax on capital income neutralizes 
the luck differential in investment outcomes in comparison to a taxless 
system. 
The Neutralization Thesis, when paired with the normative theory of luck 
egalitarianism, provides a strong reason to tax capital income.181 A tax on capital 
income will alleviate the unjust differential results that arise as a matter of luck in 
investment outcomes.  
 
175. $20 – $5 – $7.50 = $7.50. 
176. See supra Section I.B (discussing the taxation of accretions).  
177.  In our actual income tax system, such offsets are provided for by loss deductions.  
I.R.C. § 165. 
178. $5 * 50% = $2.50. 
179. Barry’s $5 pretax loss is offset by the $2.50 loss offset he gets paid by the government. 
180. $7.50 – (-$2.50) = $10. 
181. However, the fact that such a reason exists is not to say that the luck egalitarian ideals are 
matched perfectly with an income tax. For instance, riskless returns, to which the arguments in this 
Section do not apply, are still taxed under an income tax system. Ideally, a pure luck egalitarian system 
would exclude those components of returns to investment income which are unrelated to luck. This 
sort of issue is similar to any attempt by the tax code to effectuate a foundational principle by use of a 
heuristic measure. Insofar as the heuristic will not map on exactly to the foundational principle, then 
there will be errors in taxation. Take, for example, any of the loss limitation rules involving sales 
between family members in I.R.C. § 267. If the family members really are an economic unit, then such 
rules rightly limit losses. If the family members are estranged and, in economic substance, unrelated 
parties, then the tax law errs in denying the loss deduction. 
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IV. TAXPAYER RESPONSES TO A TAX ON CAPITAL INCOME 
A. A Critique of the Neutralization Thesis 
In the previous Section, I claimed that the tax on capital income helps 
neutralize differential luck on the premise that income tax taxes both the riskless 
return and the returns to bearing risk. I labeled the proposition that the tax 
compresses the distribution of investment outcomes the Neutralization Thesis. 
There is no consensus on the Neutralization Thesis in the legal literature.182 There 
is a vocal push arising from work in public finance against the idea that a tax on 
capital income taxes returns to risk bearing.183 The central notion of this critique 
revolves around the idea that investors can change their behavior in response to 
an income tax such that they would be left in the same after-tax position with 
regard to the returns to risk bearing as in a no-tax world (yield exemption).184 This 
Section summarizes the key points of this critique of the Neutralization Thesis, 
keeping in mind the differences between an income tax, a yield exemption tax, and 
a consumption tax. The details can get very technical, but the discussion here is 
intended to be informal, aiming mostly to bring out the key intuitions behind the 
critique of the Neutralization Thesis. The following Section then explains why we 
ought not expect the sort of behavioral responses that the critique of the 
Neutralization Thesis anticipates. 
1. An Illustration of the Critique with an Income Tax 
As previously done, suppose that every other source of return on investment 
is 0 so that we can focus at the moment on just the risk component. As before, 
there are two assets, Greenacre and Blackacre, both of which will return either 
four times the initial investment one period after purchase or become worthless. 
Let us again begin with how a $5 purchase of Greenacre and Blackacre, 









182. Weisbach, supra note 79, at 3. 
183.  The literature is large and includes Bankman & Griffith, supra note 79; Domar  
& Musgrave, supra note 79; Weisbach, supra note 79. 
184. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 79, at 378 (“[I]nvestors in risky assets are able  
to offset the effects of government taxation of the risk premium by changing their  
investment portfolios.”).  
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Table 5: Investment in Yield Exemption 
Greenacre 
 Period 1 Period 2 After-tax profit 
Investor (5) 20 15 
Government 0 0 0 
 
Blackacre 
 Period 1 Period 2 After-tax profit 
Investor (5) 0 (5) 
Government 0 0 0 
 
There is a $20 gap between the investor who purchased Greenacre and the 
investor who purchased Blackacre.185 
In the previous Section, I showed how Greg and Barry might be made more 
equal by a tax on capital income if they both invested $5. The tax essentially 
transferred part of Greg’s lucky earnings to Barry’s pocket. Opponents of the 
Neutralization Thesis contend that the error of the thesis is in thinking that Greg 
and Barry would invest $5 in the properties in an income tax system, the same way 
they invested in a yield exemption tax. Opponents of the Neutralization Thesis 
contend that what matters to Greg and Barry is after-tax outcomes, and the 
investors have the ability to adjust their investment such that their after-tax 
outcomes are identical for both the income tax and yield exemption tax regime.186 
Consider just Greg’s ex ante situation for the moment. Greg originally found 
it appropriate to invest just $5 in Greenacre, a quadruple or nothing bet across 
two periods. This would leave him with either $15 in profit or with a net loss of 
$5 (the loss represented by enclosure in parentheses).187 If Greg is faced with a 
50% tax on his capital income, notice what his ex ante prospects are for a larger 









185. $15 – (-$5) = $20. 
186. Domar & Musgrave, supra note 79, at 389–91. 
187. If the bet is successful, the investment will be worth $20, which is $15 more than the 
initial purchase price. If the bet is unsuccessful, the investment will be worth $0 and he will have lost 
his $5 initial investment. 
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Table 6: Investment in Income Tax (Grossed-Up) 
Win 
 Period 1 Period 2 After-tax profit 
Investor (10) 40 15 
Government 0 15 15 
 
Loss 
 Period 1 Period 2 After-tax profit 
Investor (10) 0 (5) 
Government 0 (5) (5) 
 
Greg’s after-tax outcomes in the income tax system from an investment of 
$10 are identical to the outcomes of the yield exemption system from an 
investment of $5. Although pretax gains and losses doubled to $30 and $10,188 a 
50% tax rate offsets half of those amounts. Therefore, the government imposes an 
additional tax liability on Greg of $15 if Greg wins189 and reduces Greg’s tax 
liability by $5 via the deduction for losses if Greg loses.190 If after-tax outcomes 
are the sole driver of Greg’s investment, then he will respond to the imposition of 
the tax by merely doubling his investment to replicate what he would have 
received in a yield exemption system. 
Notice the investor has to pay more, but we can assume that he will shift 
money he was investing without risk to the risky investment since he will actually 
bear the same amount of after-tax risk only after grossing up.191 Put in portfolio 
terms, the investment portfolio is reapportioned between risky and riskless assets 
such that the investor ends up bearing the same amount of risk as he would 
without tax. The motivating idea behind all of this is that income tax reduces the 
yield (numerator), but it also reduces the risk (denominator) by the same rate such 
that the amount of money the investor is paid per unit of risk does not change.192 
Therefore, an investor can simply increase the amount of risk he takes on to be 
left in the identical position as a taxless system.  
We have now laid out enough of the example to see why some might deny 
the Neutralization Thesis. As illustrated by table 9 “Investment in Income Tax 
(Grossed-Up),” if both Greg and Barry respond to the imposition of an income 
tax by changing their investment portfolios to replicate the exact after-tax 
outcomes of the portfolio they would have held in a yield exemption tax by 
 
188. The gain is calculated: $40 – $10 = $30. The loss is calculated as: $10 – $0 = $10.  
189. $30 * 50% = $15. 
190. $10 * 50% = $5. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
191. Domar & Musgrave, supra note 79, at 391. Or, if he did not have riskless investments and 
can borrow at the riskless rate of 0, he will be able to replicate the outcome. 
192. Id. at 390. 
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investing $10 instead of $5, then Greg and Barry will again be divided by $20 once 
Greenacre wins and Blackacre loses.193  The luck-induced differential outcomes 
have not been neutralized. But notice this result is not just the denial of the 
Neutralization Thesis. According to this model, the income tax is identical in its 
effects to the absence of any tax on capital income regarding the returns to  
risk-bearing. Call the premises that lead to these conclusions the equivalence 
premises. Such premises include zero transactions costs, adjustments by rational 
actors in accordance with their pecuniary self-interest, and corresponding 
adjustments by the government.194 When the equivalence premises hold, income 
tax and yield exemption tax have identical effects with respect to risky returns. 
Only when the equivalence premises do not hold, as demonstrated in the previous 
Section, will the equivalence between income tax and yield exemption break. 
2. An Illustration of the Critique with Consumption Taxes 
Finally, this analysis can be extended to the tax base that occupies much 
academic discussion: the cash flow consumption tax.195 Theoretically speaking, the 
difference between a consumption tax and an income tax can be understood as a 
difference in the time at which the investor gets to recover the basis in her 
property.196 (Practically speaking, there are a myriad of differences flowing from 
how different the two taxes would be administratively, some of which was 
covered in Section I.B.) Recall the aforementioned breakdown of income into 
consumption plus savings. From that relationship, we can derive that an income 
tax with a deduction for savings is a tax on consumption. A cash flow 
consumption tax allows for immediate recovery of basis on an  
investment—thereby exempting the amount saved from taxation—whereas the 
income tax allows for recovery of basis only upon sale.197 This means that the 
difference between a cash flow consumption tax and an income tax can be 
understood as one of timing.198 The benefit of this difference in timing is priced 
by the riskless rate, which we have assumed to be 0 in these hypotheticals. With 
respect to returns to risk-bearing, then, the cash flow consumption tax should 
conceptually track the features of the income tax. Thus, everything just stated 
about the income tax can be said again about the cash flow tax. To demonstrate 
by example, consider the following replication of the after-tax outcomes of the 
yield exemption tax using a $10 investment with cash flow consumption taxes in 
 
193. $15 – (-$5) = $20. 
194. Weisbach, supra note 79, at 32. 
195. For a more extensive explication of the cash flow consumption tax and its contrasts 
against the income tax, see supra Section I.B.  
196. Weisbach, supra note 47, at 604. 
197. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 9 (1977). 
198. See Weisbach, supra note 47, at 604 (“[T]he major difference between an income tax and 
a consumption tax is the timing of basis recovery.”). 
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place. Again, since the riskless rate is 0, the investor can invest the same amount 
of money that he would have in an income tax system. 
 
Table 7: Investment in Cash Flow Tax (Grossed-Up)  
Win 
 Period 1 Period 2 After-tax profit 
Investor (10) 40 15 
Government (5) 20 15 
 
Loss 
 Period 1 Period 2 After-tax profit 
Investor (10) 0 (5) 
Government (5) 0 (5) 
 
The only differences between the cash flow system and the income tax, 
speaking in an after-tax manner, are the periods in which Greg got to recover the 
basis and, consequently, when the government had to “pay” for such basis 
recovery. In the income tax, all of this occurs in Period 2. In the cash flow tax, all 
of this occurs in Period 1 where the taxpayer is provided an immediate deduction 
for the cost of the investment, which, at a tax rate of 50%, is the equivalent of a $5 
transfer from the government to the taxpayer.199 However, if the riskless rate is 
stipulated away as we have done here, the after-tax outcomes are identical and the 
difference of timing fails to make a difference. 
But because the after-tax outcomes of the cash flow tax and the income tax 
are identical when the amount of money initially invested is held fixed, in the case 
where the equivalence premises break and investors do not adjust their portfolios 
in response to an imposition of tax, cash flow tax and income tax will remain 
aligned in neutralizing the differential outcomes from risky investing.200 Both tax 
systems will be different from the yield exemption system, which cannot play such 
a neutralizing role. This is a particularly important point since the cash flow tax is 
sometimes thought to be the equivalent of a yield exemption tax or some rough 
approximation thereof.201  
 
199. $10 * 50% = $5. 
200. Strictly speaking, the conditions for “grossing-up” for a cash flow taxpayer are different, 
but substantively, the reasons for thinking that an investor would gross up with respect to risky 
investments in a cash flow system and not an income tax system or vice versa are sparse. For a 
detailed discussion, see Shaviro, supra note 56, at 101–03, 101 n.40 (citing Bradford, supra note 162, at 
129); William M. Gentry & R. Glenn Hubbard, Distributional Implications of Introducing a Broad-Based 
Consumption Tax, 11 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 1, 7 (1997). One possible differentiating factor is discussed 
infra Section IV.B.2. 
201. See supra Section I.B (discussing the Cary Brown theorem in relation to the equivalence 
between a cash flow consumption tax and yield exemption). 
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Looking at the ex ante outcomes of the Greenacre investment will 
demonstrate how the equivalence between the three taxes breaks when the 
investors do not adjust their portfolios in response to an imposition of tax. Two 
of these tables will be reminiscent of the discussion in the previous Section in 
which I originally introduced the idea that an income tax would neutralize luck. 
There, I had implicitly supposed that, contra the alternative model, Greg does not 
gross up his investments in response to a tax on his yield. The final table ties in 
the cash flow tax, which we already know to be equivalent to the income tax when 
the riskless rate is 0. This will demonstrate the key differences between the tax 
systems. In the next Section, I discuss some reasons why the equivalence premises 
may fail to hold. 
To begin, recall that there is a $20 difference between the winning situation 
and the losing situation of the Greenacre investment in a yield exemption tax.202 
 
Table 8: Investment in Yield Exemption 
Win 
 Period 1 Period 2 After-tax profit 
Investor (5) 20 15 
Government 0 0 0 
 
Loss 
 Period 1 Period 2 After-tax profit 
Investor (5) 0 (5) 
Government 0 0 0 
 
If Greg makes the same investment (i.e., he does not gross up to negate the 
effects of the income tax), then the expected difference between winning and 











202. $15 – (-$5) = $20. 
203. $7.50 – (-$2.50) = $10. 
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Table 9: Investment in Income Tax (No Gross-Up) 
Win 
 Period 1 Period 2 After-tax profit 
Investor (5) 20 7.5 
Government 0 7.5 7.5 
 
Loss 
 Period 1 Period 2 After-tax profit 
Investor (5) 0 (2.5) 
Government 0 (2.5) (2.5) 
 
Greg is now worse off if he wins compared to the corresponding yield 
exemption outcome anticipated, but better off if he loses. These differences reflect 
the realized outcomes by Greg and Barry since one wins and the other loses once 
the bet plays out. As noted then, this would create greater intraclass equity as the 
gap between the winner and the loser narrows from $20 in the yield exemption 
case to only $10 in the income tax case.204 
As noted earlier, the income tax is identical to the cash flow tax with regard 
to returns to bearing risk.  
 
Table 10. Investment in Cash Flow Tax (No Gross-Up) 
Win 
 Period 1 Period 2 After-tax profit 
Investor (5) 20 7.5 
Government (2.5) 10 7.5 
 
Loss 
 Period 1 Period 2 After-tax profit 
Investor (5) 0 (2.5) 
Government (2.5) 0 (2.5) 
 
The after-tax outcomes of the cash flow tax and the income tax are identical 
once the amount invested is held fixed. Thus, when investors do not adjust their 
portfolios, cash flow tax and income tax will remain aligned and both will be 
different from the yield exemption tax. As the examples have demonstrated, the 
yield exemption tax is less equitable within a risk class than both the income tax 
and the cash flow consumption tax if the investors do not gross up in response to 
a tax on capital income. Contingent on taxpayer behavior, this serves as a strong 
 
204. See supra Section III.B. 
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reason against lowering taxes on capital income, though, as demonstrated in this 
Section, not as a reason against providing deductions for savings.  
B. The Critique’s Oversights 
Like many fields of legal scholarship, a lot of the capital income tax debate 
has focused around certain idealizations. The challenge to the claim that a tax on 
capital income neutralizes the effects of luck (i.e., the Neutralization Thesis) has 
been no different. And as we have seen, given some premises about financial  
preference/behavior, what I have labeled the equivalence premises, a yield exemption 
tax is equivalent to both a consumption tax and an income tax with regard to 
returns to risk-bearing. If taxpayers do not adjust their investment portfolios in 
response to the imposition of tax, the tax on capital income creates more just 
outcomes than exempting the yield from taxation. 
Tax scholar David Weisbach, who denies the Neutralization Thesis, makes 
several lucid points regarding the very issue of the equivalence premises and their 
plausibility.205 This Section considers his insightful discussion of one key premise 
of the model: individuals respond to an imposition of tax on capital income by 
trying to maximize their after-tax economic consequences.206 Is this premise true? 
The empirical research is nowhere near conclusive one way or the other 
specifically on the effects of tax on the sorts of portfolio adjustments at issue 
here.207 Furthermore, the evidence on the general responsiveness of taxpayers to 
changes in capital income tax rates offers little guidance.208 As public finance 
economist Jonathan Gruber succinctly put it, “economists aren’t even in 
agreement on whether income taxes have a negative, zero, or even positive impact 
on savings.”209 
So then why do Weisbach and others deny the Neutralization Thesis that a 
tax on capital income neutralizes the luck differential in investment outcomes? 
Without firm empirical ground to stand on, Weisbach instead puts forward a 
priori arguments in favor of the equivalence premises that support the 
Neutralization Thesis. Indeed, Weisbach states a couple of reasons to buy into the 
verisimilitude of the equivalence premises. Though they provide valuable insight 
into one way of thinking, these are ultimately points on which reasonable people 
can disagree.  
 
205. Weisbach, supra note 79. 
206. Weisbach, supra note 79, at 44. 
207. GRUBER, supra note 46, at 718. 
208. Id. at 688–90, 707; see Weisbach, supra note 79, at 107; see also, e.g., SLEMROD & BAKIJA, 
supra note 66, at 112–13 (discussing the research on after-tax returns to savings and the rate at which 
taxpayers save).  
209. GRUBER, supra note 46, at 688–90. 
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First, he rightly notes that we are affected by our post-tax outcomes rather 
than our pretax outcomes.210 At the end of the day, the money in our pocket to 
spend is what is left after the government has taken its share. Then he pairs this 
fact with the premise that individuals are ultimately motivated by those things that 
affect them to reach the conclusion that taxpayers will respond to an income tax 
by replicating the no-tax outcomes.211 
Here, the auxiliary premise seems faulty. There may be many ways to throw a 
wrench in the gears of possible incentives. For example, the actor may have 
something less than full information. If a taxpayer thinks that he is making a 
riskless bet as he invests in Greenacre, then he will fail to be motivated by his new 
post-tax outcomes. Even if we grant Weisbach’s claim that post-tax outcomes 
rather than pretax outcomes are ultimately what affect our finances, cases  
of ignorance demonstrate that these final post-tax outcomes are not  
necessarily motivating.212 
Weisbach’s second argument relies on consistency across theories. Recall 
from earlier the notion commonly found in tax discussions that an immediate 
deduction on riskless investments is roughly like not being taxed on the yield from 
that investment.213 This thesis also requires the assumption that individuals will 
respond to the switch between a yield exemption and an immediate deduction by 
appropriately adjusting one’s portfolio to equalize post-tax outcomes in both 
systems. Weisbach correspondingly says that if we think such assumptions hold to 
equalize the value of a tax deduction with an exemption from tax for the yield, 
then there is no principled reason to assume it does not hold with respect to 
income tax and risk-bearing.214  
This second point, understood as a conditional, is roughly right. As I will 
argue infra, there may be contingent special reasons to think this sort of portfolio 
adjustment will not occur in the case of a tax levied on capital income, even if it 
does occur in the case of a deduction for savings. Regardless, in those cases in 
which such contingent special reasons do not apply, I deny the antecedent of the 
conditional. I do not expect taxpayers to adjust their portfolios to make equivalent 
a deduction for savings and a yield exemption.215 Unless there is reason to buy the 
antecedent, there is no reason to buy the consequent. 
Finally, Weisbach makes the point that “claims that individuals do not adjust 
need a theory explaining how individuals do behave . . . . Without an alternative 
 
210. Weisbach, supra note 79, at 44. 
211. Id. 
212. If Weisbach’s further premise is that people are reflective and have a tendency to correct 
any errors in their reasons-responsiveness, this will ultimately support the Neutralization Thesis. See 
infra Sections IV.B.1, IV.B.2. 
213. See supra Section I.B for a brief discussion of the Cary-Brown theorem. 
214. Weisbach, supra note 79, at 7, 22. 
215. See also Graetz, supra note 17, at 1601–02 (denying the equivalence between an immediate 
deduction and a yield exemption). 
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theory, the standard theory may be the best we have.”216 Is the idea of pecuniary 
motive the best story we have for predicting taxpayer behavior? There are, as we 
would all agree, nonpecuniary reasons for action. Relying on such nonpecuniary 
motives, in the rest of this Section, I flesh out what an alternate story of human 
behavior might look like in which taxpayers do not respond to an income tax by 
grossing up. On my understanding, the tax system represents a delegation of 
responsibilities beneficial to the taxpayer, and to subvert the system’s ends defeats 
the purpose of delegation and is thereby counter-rational. This portrait is the first 
step in my larger project of understanding the proper relations of political morality 
between state and taxpayer.  
1. Rational Behavior 
Before getting to these positive arguments regarding what we ought to 
expect from taxpayers, it will be worthwhile to examine what kind of story might 
satisfy the request at hand. Since the subjects of our inquiry are human beings and 
their behavior, we have some special reason to doubt that empirical evidence of 
irrational behavior is conclusive of future irrational behavior in contrast to 
induction on properties (broadly construed) of objects more typically. This is so 
because, presumably, humans are reflective and can correct for irrational behavior  
once discovered. 
For instance, hypothetically, a psychologist may have thus far observed that 
Karl has been acting in accordance with the gambler’s fallacy. The gambler’s 
fallacy is the mistaken belief that a probabilistic outcome’s occurrence makes it 
less likely to occur in the near future even when those events are independent 
(e.g., “This coin has come up heads three times in a row, so I’m sure the next flip 
is going to be tails.”).217 If we want to make predictions about how Karl will act in 
the future, our evidence of his acting in accordance with gambler’s fallacy in the 
past provides some reason to think that Karl will act similarly in the future. But 
such a prediction is only good until Karl realizes the error of his belief and 
corrects his behavior. After that, a prediction that Karl will follow the dictates of 
gambler’s fallacy would be mistaken. Therefore, predictions of irrationality are 
unstable in a way that predictions of rationality are not. 
This mark against evidence of irrationality is rather unusual. The same mark 
does not appear for most other subjects—the charge of an electron is not so 
subject to self-revision since electrons cannot decide to change their charge. Our 
ability to reflect on our behavior and guide ourselves through reason makes us 
 
216. Weisbach, supra note 79, at 44. 
217.  Charles T. Clotfelter & Philip J. Cook, The “Gambler’s Fallacy” in Lottery Play, 39  
MGMT. SCI. 1521, 1521 (1993). 
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unique.218 Predicting human behavior through folk psychology must make room 
for the reasons-responsiveness of our decisions. 
Therefore, our best tax policy must take into account both the empirical 
evidence of how people currently behave with regard to tax laws and whatever 
reasons they may have to change their behavior. I aim to provide exposition of the 
latter sort. In the remainder of this Article, I will explain and argue in favor of the 
final lemma: the balance of reasons weighs against undermining the tax law. 
Whereas Weisbach states that taxpayers who fail to adjust their portfolios in 
response to an imposition of tax “are making systematic mistakes,” I contend that 
the actions of such taxpayers are consistent with a broader view of rationality that 
takes moral reasons into account.219  
2. Broad Rationality and the Neutralization Thesis 
Scholars are sometimes too quick to paint people as Holmesian bad men,220 
whose lust for theft is contained only by the stick of criminal punishment.221 If 
that is right, if all laws are merely ways to impose costs (or benefits) for choosing 
one or another action, then it does seem plausible that individuals would respond 
to the imposition of an income tax by readjusting their position to negate its 
effects. So long as the IRS does not come after them, the bad men are happy to 
take whatever benefits they can. But surely most of us are not like the bad men. 
For us, the threat of criminal sanctions is not the reason we refrain from theft. 
When we consider the perspective of taxpayers, we ought to take into 
consideration that people either desire or consider it a constraint that they pay 
their fair share into the stock of public funds as a matter of social responsibility 
rather than to maximize financial profits.222 Once we shift our perspective thus, 
we will find both primary and derivative moral reasons not to undermine the  
tax law.223 
 
218.  1 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 18–20 (C.D.C. Reeve trans., Hackett Publ’g  
Co. 2014) (c. 384 B.C.E.).  
219. Weisbach, supra note 79, at 44. 
220. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 1 BOS. L. SCH. MAG., Feb. 1897, at 1, 3 
(“If you want to know the law and nothing else you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for 
the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict . . . .”). 
221.  See also H.L.A. HART, Legal Responsibility and Excuses, in PUNISHMENT AND 
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 113, at 28, 44–45 (noting the 
characterization of the law as a goad as misleading). 
222. See infra note 227 and accompanying text. 
223. Here, I do not mean to indicate that derivative moral reasons are means distinct from the 
ends. Obeying the tax law requires, in most cases, paying taxes and paying taxes is the “end” of 
contributing to the common pool. I am merely indicating that the derivative moral reason to obey the 
tax law would not exist but for the moral obligation to contribute to the common pool, and is thereby 
derived from the primary moral reason. 
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The first reason is that we have a prima facie moral obligation not to 
undermine the law. John Rawls calls such an obligation the “duty of justice.”224 
Laws, of course, can be undermined by violation of their literal meaning and by 
violation of their purpose.225 The primary purpose of an income tax, in contrast to 
a yield exemption tax, is the taxation of capital income. 226  And, surely, to 
neutralize an imposition of tax on capital income so as to put oneself in the same 
position as one would be in a taxless state of affairs would violate such purposes. 
If Rawls is right about the duty of justice, then this is quite a powerful reason in 
favor of respecting law’s purpose because moral obligations provide reasons with 
lexical priority over self-interest. 227  One is not permitted to, say, set fire to 
another’s property no matter how much profit the arson might bring him. 
The duty of justice can be justified on multiple grounds. Of these I take the 
following argument to be the strongest. The duty of justice follows from a more 
general principle not to harm those who make sacrifices to cooperate with us. The 
tax law is not a random collection of rules; the laws are meant to put into effect 
principles of justice. When citizens skirt the tax law, it upsets the pattern by which 
benefits and burdens are to be distributed.228 The duty of justice thus works to 
connect the justice of social institutions, here the tax law, with individuals’ 
responsibilities towards such social institutions. Once we have cooperated to set 
up just social institutions, it is then morally impermissible for individuals to 
 
224. RAWLS, supra note 12, at 99. For a discussion of the duty of justice and natural duties 
more generally, see id. at 98–101. Rawls uses the “undermine” language to describe the duty of justice 
in id. at 302. The duty of justice has a rich history in legal academia extending back to Plato’s  
Crito. PLATO, CRITO (c. 399 B.C.E.), reprinted in PLATO: COMPLETE WORKS 37 (John M. Cooper  
& D.S. Hutchinson eds., G.M.A. Grube trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1997). 
225. For example, a tax minimization strategy is considered an abusive tax shelter if it goes 
against the purpose of the tax law. Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Shelters and Statutory 
Interpretation: A Much Needed Purposive Approach, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 697, 703 (2009). 
226. Since my arguments defending the Neutralization Thesis rely intimately on the purpose 
of the tax law, one may thus question whether the arguments I have raised for a tax on capital income 
will apply to the consumption tax. As I have shown in Section IV.A.2, a cash flow consumption tax 
can neutralize the differential effects of luck on capital income if taxpayers do not adjust their 
portfolios in response. Therefore, a legislature may, for instance, move from a yield exemption system 
to a cash flow tax with the purpose of taxing returns to risk-bearing. In those cases, the arguments 
presented in this Section would apply. However, in cases where deductions for savings are given for 
other reasons, such as increasing investment, the arguments presented here would not apply. 
227. See NOZICK, supra note 87, at 29 (discussing rights as constraints); Ronald Dworkin, 
Rights as Trumps, in ARGUING ABOUT LAW 335, 335–36 (Aileen Kavanagh & John Oberdiek  
eds., 2009) (situating rights as trumping background justifications). 
228. See also James M. Delaney, Where Ethics Merge with Substantive Law—An Analysis of 
Tax Motivated Transactions, 38 IND. L. REV. 295, 295–96 (2005) (“The proliferation of [tax shelters 
that follow the letter of the law but violate its spirit] is detrimental to the U.S. system of taxation and 
is in conflict with the policy reasons underlying the creation of the progressive tax system in the 
United States.”); cf. S. REP. NO. 99-313, at 713–18 (1986) (discussing the unfair distribution of 
burdens that can arise from legal avoidance of tax). 
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undermine those very institutions. As Socrates states in the Crito, undermining the 
law mistreats the fellow members of our society.229  
On this picture, the rearrangement of one’s portfolio in response to a tax on 
capital income is normatively categorized like tax evasion—in that they both 
undermine the law—rather than permissible tax planning. Tax planning, so long as 
it does not violate the purposes of the tax law, does not constitute a violation of 
the duty of justice. 
The second plausible story about law-following continues with the idea that 
laws are supposed to offer genuine guidance for our behavior rather than mere 
conditional threats.230 For all but the most radical anarchists, we understand that 
we have a moral obligation to contribute our fair share towards a common pool of 
resources from which we can fund government expenditures, broadly construed, 
such as national defense and welfare programs. Of course, it is quite difficult to 
figure out what constitutes our fair share. Even getting at a rough approximation 
would require intense study of political theory and its application in a manner that 
ordinary citizens cannot afford. 
So instead, we delegate the deliberation on what constitutes a fair 
contribution to individuals in the legislature and the Treasury, whose job it is to 
provide expert guidance on such matters.231 The deal we make with these experts 
can be characterized in the first-person thus: I am no longer going to worry about 
what constitutes my fair share towards the common pool. Instead, I am just going 
to live my life in the pretax world, and at the end of the year, you will calculate for 
me the amount that political morality demands I pay.232 Since following the tax 
law serves the citizen’s primary moral end of contributing a sufficient amount 
towards the common pool, he has a derivative moral reason to follow the tax law. 
On this picture of the first-person perspective on law, which has been called 
epistemic internalization,233 it makes no sense to nullify the purpose of the tax law. 
Suppose you have a $5,000 tax burden at the end of the year as determined by the 
federal government. If you knew that you could get away with wholesale tax 
evasion without anyone, including the government, being ever the wiser, would 
 
229. PLATO, supra note 224, at 44. 
230. Rebecca Stone offers many ways that we may be “good men” in her paper. See Rebecca 
Stone, Legal Design for the “Good Man,” 102 VA. L. REV. 1767, 1784–86 (2016). Here, I present a 
picture that is particular to tax law using Stone’s ideas about “epistemic internalizers.” Id. 
231.  See also SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 154–92 (2011) (discussing social planning generally 
and the delegation of social planning within the context of analytic jurisprudence).  
232.  This feature also explains one advantage of having an ex post tax on risk over a 
sovereign’s command for the citizenry to reduce risk. Although, ideally, they would have roughly 
similar outcomes regarding risk, the ex post tax would not require any effort on the part of the citizen 
to comply. If there were a command to take on less risk, the citizen would need to consider how 
much risk he would have taken on had the law not been implemented, then calculate further how to 
organize his portfolio of investments to meet the command.  
233. Stone, supra note 230, at 1776–77. 
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you?234 For the Holmesian bad man, the answer is yes. The reason to follow the 
law for the bad man is that the law is backed by a very large stick.235 As soon as 
the stick can be avoided, there is no more reason left to follow the law. For the 
epistemic internalizer, however, the avoidance of sanction is neither here nor 
there. Nullifying the demands of the tax law goes against the whole reason we 
delegated the deliberation to the experts in the legislature and the Treasury in the 
first place. The internalizer just wants to pay his fair share without having the 
burden of deliberating on the matter himself, so whatever the IRS demands at the 
end of the day is what he will pay. 
The same can be said for grossing up to nullify the legislature’s decision to 
impose a tax on capital income.236 If the imposition of a tax on capital income is 
justified under luck egalitarian principles, then it would defeat the purpose of 
having delegated away the political deliberation to respond by increasing the 
effects of luck in a way that would perfectly negate the imposition of a tax on 
capital income. From the point of view of epistemic internalization, tax law is not 
some fight between one side trying to take money and the other side trying to 
keep it. The tax law is a cooperative effort that represents an earnest attempt to 
settle a question of political morality in a reasonably expedient way.237 
This is a way of thinking about the tax law distinct from the dominant 
frameworks of distributive justice and economic efficiency. Justice and efficiency 
are important concerns of the state but certainly not the only ones. Legal theorists, 
dating back at least to Aristotle in Book X of the Nichomachean Ethics, have 
thought that one of law’s critical functions is to facilitate moral action on the part 
of its citizens. Typically, such a function is the subject of scholarship in criminal  
law; criminal law’s conduct rules are plainly meant to guide behavior.238 Of course, 
there is no reason to think that criminal law, and more generally the imposition of 
punishments for bad behavior, should be the only moral compass available in  
the law.  
 
234. Cf. PLATO, REPUBLIC (c. 375 B.C.E.), reprinted in PLATO: COMPLETE WORKS, supra note 
224, at 971, 1000–01 (discussing the parable of the ring of Gyges and the moral nature of man). 
235. Holmes, supra note 220. 
236. Whether this argument also applies to a cash flow consumption tax is discussed supra  
note 225. 
237. Note here that I am not of the view that all tax laws are to be viewed this way. The 
picture I have presented is a simplification. Some tax laws are passed for the purpose of encouraging 
or discouraging certain behaviors. Tax benefits for investments in qualified opportunity zones,  
I.R.C. § 1400Z-2, would be an example of such a tax. The purpose of the law is to encourage 
investments in designated low-income communities. Such rules are made with the intent that 
taxpayers take the rules into consideration in deciding their behaviors rather than taking stock at the 
end of the year. My position is that such laws, in the U.S. federal tax system, are exceptions rather 
than the rule. As a practical matter, they must be. Human cognition is a finite resource, and it surely 
cannot be expected of the general public to understand and plan around the thousands of rules that 
compose the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. 
238.  E.g., John Gardner, Introduction to H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND  
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 113, at xiii, xlii–xliii.  
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On my picture of tax law, the government can provide moral guidance 
without relying on sanction. In essence, the rules of tax law form a kind of  
“self-help” tool—a tool which aids individuals in meeting the moral 
responsibilities that citizens grasp that they have but have difficulty defining. 
Individuals who recognize their social obligations can expediently fulfill them by 
following the rules set out in the tax code. For most of us, filling out an IRS Form 
1040-EZ is a more manageable way to figure out our social obligations than 
reasoning from first principles. 
And so we have these two competing pictures of human psychology with 
respect to the law. These differences in psychological stipulation entail different 
behaviors with respect to the law. On a narrow conception of rationality, there is 
financial reason to undermine the imposition of a tax on capital income, and it is 
irrational to have the same investment portfolio in both an income tax and a yield 
exemption tax. On my broader conception of rationality, the taxpayer, despite 
there being financial reasons to do otherwise, has primary and derivative moral 
reasons not to undermine the tax law. The primary moral reason, the duty of 
justice, applies to all taxpayers, and the derivative moral reason applies to those 
taxpayers who are epistemic internalizers with respect to the tax law. Naturally, 
moral reasons have lexical priority over prudential reasons. 239  Maintaining the 
same portfolio across an income tax and a yield exemption tax is rational on the 
broader conception that takes into account our moral reasons for action. Any 
prediction about investor behavior must take this balance of reasons  
into account.240 
In this Section, I have provided both negative arguments that the 
equivalence conditions are false as well as two positive reasons that citizens have 
to deviate from the behavior dictated by the equivalence premises. My aim was to 
paint an alternate picture of taxpayer rationality in contrast to the standard 
economic one that pervades the literature. By focusing purely on financial 
incentives without considering moral sources of motivation, the critique of the 
Neutralization Thesis fails to see that the balance of reasons weighs against 
investors adjusting their portfolios in response to the imposition of a tax on 
capital income. Insofar as my arguments in favor of the moral reasons are sound, 
we have good reason to support the Neutralization Thesis. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have sketched the foundations of a theory of distributive 
justice and how it may be applied in the tax law. I argued in favor of the truth of 
luck egalitarianism in a manner that put option luck on the same level as brute 
luck in that both are causes of unjust distributions. Brute luck egalitarianism, on 
 
239. See supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
240. See supra Section IV.B.1. 
First to Printer_Nam.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/14/21  7:17 AM 
1118 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:1067 
the other hand, is both too harsh on the victims of bad option luck and is 
unnecessarily handicapped in taxing the beneficiaries of good option luck.  
A nuanced luck egalitarianism better accords with our intuitions of  
distributive justice. 
From here, I discussed how the tax law might present an opportune vehicle 
for reducing differential outcomes from option luck by way of taxing the most  
well-off members of society and capital income. Winner-take-all markets have 
created large gaps in economic outcome for small differences in performance. 
Given the intensity of such competitions, we have good reason to believe that the 
largest winners in the marketplace have been beneficiaries of luck. Therefore, a 
tax on the most well-off members of society would help mitigate the differential 
effects of luck. Given that most returns to investment come from bearing risk 
rather than postponing the availability of one’s wealth, capital income can vary 
wildly between winners and losers. The income tax system neutralizes the 
differential effects of luck by sharing the wins and losses of investors. 
In the final part of my argument, I considered a popular critique of the 
Neutralization Thesis arising from work in public finance. According to the 
critique, taxpayers will respond to the imposition of a tax on capital income by 
eliminating the effect of such a tax through adjustments to their portfolio of 
investments. Ultimately, I rejected the plausibility of the argument and offered an 
alternate way to think about the perspective of taxpayers. Taxpayers have, under 
the duty of justice, a primary moral obligation not to undermine the law. 
Furthermore, the tax law provides a solution to the epistemic problem of how 
much one ought to contribute towards the societal pool. Therefore, taxpayers 
have derivative moral reason, flowing from their primary moral obligation to make 
the contribution to the societal pool, not to undermine the imposition of a tax on 
capital income. 
If my arguments are sound, then recent trends in America towards lower 
taxes on capital income and the most well-off members of society are worrying 
from the perspective of luck egalitarianism. I certainly do not take myself to have 
provided an all-things-considered argument in favor of the capital income tax and 
a tax on the most well-off. Distributive justice, although an important virtue of 
social institutions, 241  is not the only factor that legislators should consider in 
writing laws. If I am right, however, then there is at least one strong pro tanto 
reason in their favor. 
 
241. RAWLS, supra note 12, at 3. 
